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DISCLOSING THE DANGER: STATE ATTORNEY ETHICS RULES MEET 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Victor B. Flatt* 
 
Abstract 
This Article suggests a novel concept in climate change law and 
attorney ethics law by proposing that many states’ attorney ethics laws 
could be interpreted to require, or at least permit, attorneys to disclose 
client activity relating to greenhouse gas emissions. Every state has some 
form of ABA Model Rule 1.6(b), either requiring or allowing attorneys to 
disclose client activities that result in death or substantial bodily harm. 
This Article asserts that precedent surrounding this disclosure rule 
indicates that the rule could be applicable to harms caused by greenhouse 
gas emissions. Attorney disclosures, in turn, could impact a wide swath of 
greenhouse gas-emitting activities, making it more transparent and, in 
certain cases, requiring attorneys to counsel cessation of such activities 
or withdraw from representation. Because climate advocacy 
organizations are seeking to use all legal tools at their disposal to slow or 
stop greenhouse gas emissions, attorney ethics law could present an 
additional strategic tool to try and control greenhouse gas emissions 
activities. Thus, attorneys from the private sector and in government 
should be aware of the potential ethical issues they may face when 
handling greenhouse gas-related legal work. 
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[Climate change] impacts include greater likelihood of injury and death 
due to more intense heat waves and fires . . . foodborne and waterborne 
diseases . . . and . . . undernutrition in poor regions. (high confidence)1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine that you are an attorney working for ExxonMobil in 2014. 
ExxonMobil’s shareholders have just won a victory requiring the company to 
analyze and disclose financial risks to the company related to greenhouse gas 
regulation.2 This comes four years after the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) issued a guidance document detailing how climate change impacts that affect 
a company’s bottom line, including risks related to regulatory controls, should be 
disclosed in publicly traded filings.3  
Your client wishes to respond by putting out an online “one-pager” noting that 
the company expects no significant regulation of carbon or greenhouse gases4 for 
the next forty years; in other words, any financial risks from regulation are minimal. 
You know that between 2010 and 2014, the United States Department of 
Transportation and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have 
put in place regulations mandating large gains in fuel economy for new motor 
                                               
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2014: Synthesis 
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at 68 (Core Writing Team, R. K. Pachauri and 
L.A. Meyer eds., 2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINA 
L_full_wcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8LM-YAF7] [hereinafter IPCC, Climate Change 
2014]. 
2 See Natasha Lamb & Danielle Fugere, Exxon Mobil’s Commitment to Carbon Asset 
Risk Is Just the Beginning, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2014, 12:59 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/exxon-mobil-carbon-asset-risk-pressure 
-oil-gas-investors [https://perma.cc/W8TQ-LA5T] (discussing how a shareholder proposal 
prompted ExxonMobil to voluntarily committed, in exchange for withdrawal of the proposal, 
to publish a report on how it assesses carbon asset risk). 
3 Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
4 Greenhouse gases are so-named because their chemical composition causes heat to be 
trapped in Earth’s atmosphere, creating an aptly named “greenhouse effect.” While 
greenhouse gases are a significant part of what allows life to flourish on the planet, human-
made greenhouse gas emissions, primarily carbon dioxide and methane from the industrial, 
energy, and transportation sectors, are the primary drivers of anthropogenic climate change. 
See IPCC, Climate Change 2014, supra note 1, at 4, 44–49. 
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vehicles;5 the European Union has expanded its greenhouse gas regulation;6 
California has adopted an economy-wide greenhouse gas cap and trade regulatory 
system;7 and international negotiations have now focused on all countries, including 
the United States, submitting greenhouse gas reduction targets.8 You are also 
familiar with the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, 
which ties specific deaths to increasing impacts of climate change from greenhouse 
gas emissions, including deaths from heatwaves, disease vectors, wildfires, 
droughts, and possibly extreme weather events.9  
What do you advise your client about its proposed one-page explanation that it 
will not face any significant greenhouse gas regulations during the next 40 years? 
What if you advise your client that perhaps the disclosure should be more nuanced 
about the possibility of regulation, yet the client refuses to change its proposal? Are 
you required to disclose to relevant authorities (in this case the SEC and the New 
York State Attorney General) that you believe this one-page disclosure might be 
misleading, and that the failure to adequately disclose risks might facilitate the 
emission of more greenhouse gases that could kill or injure more people? 
Or imagine that you are an EPA attorney working in the Agency’s Office of 
Air Quality Planning and Standards at Research Triangle Park in North Carolina 
during the Trump Administration.10 Contrary to generally accepted economic data, 
and a prior guidance estimating the social cost of carbon (the harm carbon emissions 
                                               
5 Eyder Peralta, Obama Administration Unveils New Fuel-Efficiency Standards, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 28, 2012, 12:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2012/08/28/160172356/reports-obama-administration-will-unveil-new-fuel-efficiency-
standards [https://perma.cc/82G7-NTTN]. 
6 Toni Johnson, The Debate over Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 3, 2011), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/debate-over-greenhouse-
gas-cap-and-trade [https://perma.cc/LW6R-UA4T] (“The European Union, meanwhile, 
continues to expand its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)--created in 2005 and credited with 
helping it meet Kyoto targets.”). 
7 Felicity Barringer, California Adopts Limits on Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/business/energy-environment/california-
adopts-cap-and-trade-system-to-limit-emissions.html [https://perma.cc/E73U-UU6R]. 
8 David Biello, Climate Talks Consensus: All Countries Should Cut Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions--In Future, SCI. AM. (Dec. 11, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article 
/climate-talks-consensus-a/ [https://perma.cc/S2CF-2BSZ]. 
9 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, (Christopher 
B. Field et al., eds., 2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-
PartA_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y9Q-QNX6]. 
10 For more information about this EPA office and its role, see Office of Air Quality 
Planning and Standards (OAQPS), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/about 
epa/about-office-air-and-radiation-oar#oaqps [https://perma.cc/B79B-2Y42] (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2019). 
 
572 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
cause) at around forty dollars per ton,11 political appointees at the EPA have 
informed you that in new notice and comment rulemakings12 regarding regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions at electricity generating units, you should assume the 
social cost of carbon is only one dollar per ton.13 This reduction is based on the new 
government policy to only count greenhouse gas emission harms in the United States 
(not international harms) and not to incorporate certain future harms, due to 
“uncertainty.”14 You know that notice and comment rulemaking is subject to the 
Administrative Procedure Act requirement that agency actions cannot be “arbitrary” 
or “capricious,”15 and you believe the proposal to be both arbitrary and capricious. 
Do you have to advise your political superiors that using the one dollar per ton figure 
would be a direct misstatement of all available evidence and contrary to prior 
government precedent requiring the EPA to examine costs and benefits of future 
generations? 
If your superiors still insist upon you employing the one dollar per ton figure 
as justification for reducing greenhouse gas regulation, must you withdraw from 
representing the government in this case? Even though the rulemaking process will 
be fully public, do you have to disclose any confidential information you are aware 
of about industry lobbying or conversations on lessening emphasis of scientific and 
economic data? Do you have to report this to the authorities because it could 
endanger human life? Who would be the authority that could take action to prevent 
harm from occurring?  
The two fact patterns presented above have occurred. ExxonMobil posted an 
online risk disclosure report about the impact of climate change on its business 
operations and assets in 2014, claiming that its outlook had not changed and that 
                                               
11 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support 
Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Under Executive Order 12866, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 16 (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/R4LK-CTDQ]. 
12 Under Section 503 of the Administrative Procedure Act, when promulgating a new 
regulation or changing an existing regulation, an agency is required to go through several 
procedural steps, including providing the public with “[g]eneral notice” of the proposed rule 
and furnishing the “opportunity to participate . . . through submission of written data, views, 
or arguments”—i.e., comment—on the proposal. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2018). In accord 
with these requirements, this process is often referred to as notice and comment rulemaking. 
See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 73–74 (6th ed. 2019). 
13 See, e.g., Chris Mooney, New EPA Document Reveals Sharply Lower Estimate of the 
Cost of Climate Change, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/10/11/new-epa-document-reveals-sharply-
lower-estimate-of-the-cost-of-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/UX4K-9GCF].  
14 See id. 
15 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
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climate change would have no impact on the company.16 In 2017, the Trump 
Administration issued a regulatory impact analysis to be used in rulemaking, which 
suggests that the harm or cost from greenhouse gas emissions is much lower than 
available evidence would suggest.17 We do not have full information about who was 
involved in pressing for the rule’s alteration. 
Both of these actions have been or will be legally challenged by state attorneys 
general. The New York Attorney General sued ExxonMobil for deliberately 
misleading its current and prospective investors about the company’s value by its 
“longstanding fraudulent scheme” to misstate the likely impact of climate change 
regulations on its revenues and assets.18 Several states plan to challenge the legality 
of the Trump Administration’s proposed changes to the Clean Power Plan, and 
prominent environmental law experts note that the social cost of carbon proposal 
would not be justified by science or economics and would thus likely be illegal.19 
                                               
16 KATHY HIPPLE AND TOM SANZILLO, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. AND FIN. ANALYSIS, 
EXXONMOBIL’S CLIMATE RISK REPORT: DEFECTIVE AND UNRESPONSIVE 1 (2018) 
http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ExxonMobils-Climate-Risk-Report-Defective-
and-Unresponsive-March-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK6U-KNGF]; see Press Release, 
ExxonMobil, ExxonMobil Releases Reports to Shareholders on Managing Climate Risk 
(Mar. 31, 2014), https://news.exxonmobil.com/press-release/exxonmobil-releases-reports-
shareholders-managing-climate-risk [https://perma.cc/V68N-H8D3] (referencing the report, 
which is no longer publicly available on the Internet); see also Ken Cohen, Managing 
Climate Risk, ENERGYFACTOR BY EXXONMOBIL: PERSPECTIVES BLOG (Mar. 31, 2014), 
https://energyfactor.exxonmobil.com/perspectives/managing-climate-risk/ [https://perma.cc 
/B4DY-345A]; Exxon Mobil Shrugs Off Climate Change Risk to Profit, BBC (Apr. 1, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-26830555 [https://perma.cc/82LX-JE2J] (“Exxon 
Mobil, . . . said in a new report that world climate policies are ‘highly unlikely’ to stop it 
from producing and selling fossil fuels in the near future.”). 
17 Mooney, supra note 13; see Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Review of the Clean 
Power Plan: Proposal, EPA (Oct. 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
10/documents/ria_proposed-cpp-repeal_2017-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SF3-MVQY]. 
18 Complaint at 1, New York v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, No. 452044/2018 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct., filed Oct. 24, 2018); see also John Schwartz, New York Sues Exxon Mobil, Saying it 
Deceived Shareholders on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.ny 
times.com/2018/10/24/climate/exxon-lawsuit-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/22QG-
9NLZ]. In December 2019, the court ruled against the state of New York on its claim that 
Exxon violated the Martin Act, a state law designed to combat shareholder fraud. John 
Schwartz, New York Loses Climate Change Fraud Case Against Exxon Mobil, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2sdIAYF [https://perma.cc/6498-BHVJ] [hereinafter 
Schwartz, New York Loses Climate Change Fraud Case]. 
19 Oliver Millman, Fightback Begins over Trumps “Illegal and Irresponsible” Clean 
Power Appeal, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2017/oct/10/trump-climate-change-clean-power-plan-fightback [https://perma.cc/R5NY-
AQQW]; Michael Greenstone & Cass R. Sunstein, Donald Trump Should Know: This Is 
What Climate Change Costs Us, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/opinion/donald-trump-should-know-this-is-what-
climate-change-costs-us.html [https://perma.cc/PX3WC677]. See generally Montana Envtl. 
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But what about the attorneys that surrounded these and similar decisions where 
greenhouse gas regulatory requirements may not have been followed? The American 
Bar Association (ABA) has already passed a resolution calling for attorney action to 
work towards reducing climate change.20 Although attorneys are not bound by ABA 
resolutions, official ABA recognition of attorneys’ responsibility to “address climate 
change and take action,”21 along with attorneys’ societal obligations in general,22 
suggests that attention should be paid to the issue.  
Beyond their general ethical obligations, attorneys may also face concern about 
specific ethical rules that carry the threat of attorney discipline. Certainly, an 
attorney assisting the perpetration of a fraud can face serious ethics charges23—not 
to mention be criminally prosecuted in some states.24 Additionally, state ethics rules 
provide that an attorney either may or must disclose client behavior if necessary “to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”25 
But what of the attorneys who simply know of significant emissions that might 
be lessened if disclosed? What about the attorneys in the examples above, who 
                                               
Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (D. Mont. 2017) (holding 
that OSMRE’s approval of a coal mining project was arbitrary and capricious when it failed 
to consider the costs of additional greenhouse gas emissions via the social cost of carbon), 
amended in part, aff’d in part, 2017 WL 5047901 (D. Mont. 2017). 
20 AM. BAR ASS’N, Resolution 111, https://johndernbach.com/wp-content/uploads/201 
9/08/111-annual-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YN9-9HWE]; see also John Dernbach, 
American Bar Association Urges Broad Range of Action to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas 




21 AM. BAR ASS’N, Resolution 111, https://johndernbach.com/wp-content/uploads/201 
9/08/111-annual-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YN9-9HWE]. 
22 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (recognizing 
that, among other responsibilities “[l]awyers play a vital role in the preservation of society”). 
23 ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) states that an attorney cannot assist a client in the 
commission of a crime or a fraud. According to the American Bar Association’s Business 
Law newsletter, all states have a form of this rule. William Freivogel, ABA Model Rules and 
the Business Lawyer, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0077/ 
materials/ethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8TR-XSJW]. 
24 See, e.g., Jay Adkisson, Advising About or Assisting with a Fraudulent Transfer Is 
About to Get Very Dangerous in California, FORBES (Oct. 28, 2018, 11:04 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/10/28/advising-or-assisting-with-a-fraudul 
ent-transfer-is-about-to-get-very-dangerous-in-california/#514bc05f118d [https://perma.cc/ 
REZ7-LDVG] (discussing the recent change to rule 1.2.1 of the California Rules of 
Professional Conduct that now makes it an offense to “assist a client in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal . . . .” and this rule’s potential effects on attorneys practicing in the 
state, given that fraudulent transfers are criminal offenses under California Penal Code 
sections 154, 155, and 531).  
25 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b). For a full discussion of ABA Model 
Rule 1.6 and analogous (and varying) state rules, see infra Part I.  
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advise against actions and then stop direct representation? Are they still required to 
disclose their knowledge and belief regarding the legality of actions? Could they 
face disciplinary action for failure to do so? The answers to these questions could be 
yes in many states.  
No state supreme courts have yet applied attorney ethical rules to require 
disclosure of dangerous client activities relating to greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, given climate activism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,26 the ease of 
filing attorney ethics complaints,27 and requirements to disclose potential ethical 
violations of other attorneys,28 the application of ethical rules to representing 
greenhouse gas emitters is not only possible but likely.  
Ethics rules allowing or requiring disclosure of client confidential information 
because of threats to human health and life have been considered applicable to 
hazardous waste releases since the 1990s, despite the fact that harms from hazardous 
releases often have less definitive timing or less predictable harm as compared to 
more traditional threats to life.29 Similarly, the threats from greenhouse gas 
emissions also have indeterminate timing and generalized harm, qualities that 
distinguish such activities from the threats more traditionally covered by disclosure 
rules. But certain differences make ethical complaints about failing to disclose 
clients’ impacts on greenhouse gas emissions far more likely.  
Few, if any, attorneys have faced ethics complaints because of hazardous waste 
releases. This lack of ethics complaints is likely due to the fact that the government 
is legally required to correct such releases upon discovery and reporting.30 Because 
the government is likely to correct the harms pursuant to its statutory obligations, 
attorney disclosures would not “prevent any new harm,” meaning the requirement 
to disclose life-threatening information would not apply.31 The same is not true of 
climate change. Because of the lack of any comprehensive federal regulatory scheme 
to address major greenhouse gas emissions and the scale of the problem, climate 
change is fundamentally different from an ethics standpoint than more traditional, 
heavily regulated pollution like hazardous waste releases.  
                                               
26 See infra Part II. 
27 See infra Part IV, for a general description of this process in Texas. 
28 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (“A lawyer who knows that another 
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a 
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”).  
29 See Irma S. Russell, Cries and Whispers: Environmental Hazards, Model Rule 1.6, 
and the Attorney’s Conflicting Duties to Clients and Others, 72 WASH. L. REV. 409, 413–15 
(1997) (discussing Model Rule 1.6 and suggesting changes to the rule to account for 
situations where attorney silence can exacerbate environmental catastrophes). 
30 For instance, Section 3004(u) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (2018), directs federal and state authorities to administer 
“corrective action for all releases of hazardous waste” that may occur at a RCRA-permitted 
facility.  
31 See discussion infra, Part III. 
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When the dearth of a government obligation or action is coupled with a 
sophisticated “climate activism bar,” which is using any and all legal methods in its 
arsenal to push for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,32 the future likelihood 
of ethical complaints increases greatly. Climate activism already includes lawsuits 
under common law, statutory law, constitutional law, international law, and the 
public trust doctrine.33 One litigation avenue that has been missing is the 
requirements imposed on attorneys by their state bars. As the deadly nature of 
greenhouse gas emissions and our ethical responsibilities as humans and attorneys 
becomes more and more discussed in political and regulatory circles,34 that is likely 
to change. 
Though political discussions in the United States might suggest otherwise,35 
there is little doubt that climate change has and will continue to cause untold deaths, 
and many more serious health impacts the world over.36 Given that: (1) greenhouse 
gas emissions in the aggregate drive climate change,37 (2) credible evidence 
concerning fraudulent activities surrounding greenhouse gas reporting,38 and (3) 
recent attempts at the federal level to reverse prior climate policy in the face of all 
                                               
32 Mark Clarke et al., Climate Change Litigation: A New Class of Action, WHITE & 
CASE 5 (2018), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publication 
s/thought-leadership-climate-change-litigation-18-single-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5J2-
XDP6] (discussing current trends in climate change litigation). 
33 See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857–58 (9th Cir. 
2012) (holding that federal common law nuisance claims against energy companies for sea 
level rise are displaced by the Clean Air Act); see also Humane Soc’y of the United States 
v. McCarthy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 280 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing an APA claim seeking to 
compel an EPA response to a rulemaking petition proposing the regulation of CAFOs as a 
stationary source under the Clean Air Acts); Dana Drugmand, France, Home of the Paris 
Agreement, Faces Lawsuit for Lack of Climate Progress, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Dec. 
20, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/12/20/france-lawsuit-paris-climate-
agreement/ [https://perma.cc/SSZ6-QGHZ] (“The upcoming lawsuit says . . . the French 
government has not adequately addressed climate change, breaching its legal 
obligations . . . outlined in international agreements such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the [UNFCCC], and the Paris Agreement.”); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. 
Supp. 3d 1224, 1260–62 (D. Or. 2016) (denying defendant’s motions to dismiss the 
substantive due process and public trust doctrine claims of young environmental activists 
against the United States for failing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions). 
34 See Dernbach, supra note 20. 
35 John Swartz, Global Warming Concerns Among Americans Rise in New Poll, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/climate/americans-global-
warming-poll.html [https://perma.cc/S7Q8-3WZ8] (“Political party affiliation is strongly 
associated with acceptance of the overwhelming scientific consensus on global warming, 
with Democrats tending to accept it and Republicans tending to reject it.”). 
36 See infra Part II. 
37 See IPCC SPECIAL REPORT (2018), infra note 158, at 2–8 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra Part III. 
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known evidence,39 attorneys for many large corporate entities and the government 
may be subject to attorney ethics complaints for failing to disclose activities related 
to greenhouse gas emissions. Yet because this issue has yet to be fully discussed or 
explored, an attorney may be woefully unaware of the risk she faces. 
While not yet publicly on the radar of legal climate activists, the possibility of 
pressuring or influencing attorney behavior using state ethics laws is an opportunity 
that climate activists will likely embrace as another arrow in their quiver to avoid, 
limit, or publicize greenhouse gas emissions. Even though state supreme courts or 
administrative bodies will have the final say on whether their state’s ethical rules 
apply to create new disclosure obligations,40 and states can also alter ethics rules by 
statute,41 it only takes one state applying ethics rules to clients’ greenhouse gas 
emitting activities to create this risk. 
This Article examines ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1) and 
analogous state rules regarding disclosure of client actions that could cause possible 
death or serious bodily harm. It argues that there are multiple ways in which client 
activity dealing with greenhouse gases may expose an attorney to ethical breaches 
if she fails to report these activities in certain circumstances.42 Failure to disclose in 
certain circumstances may also lead to tort liability and onerous financial exposure 
of the attorney.43 
The ramifications of potential attorney liability for failing to disclose client 
greenhouse gas emissions cannot be completely explored in this Article, but they are 
significant. This Article is the first to both articulate greenhouse gas emissions as a 
new area of attorney ethics law and posit that this concern will provide a legal and 
practical tool that could ultimately reduce greenhouse gas emissions.44 This Article 
is not a call to file ethics complaints, but rather a recognition that there is a 
substantial possibility of such actions being filed. If the substantive basis for 
emissions-based complaints is possible, it is only a matter of time before climate 
change activists recognize ethical complaints as a new tactic in one or more states. 
As a climate change attack strategy, attorney ethics complaints avoid many of the 
more significant impediments to contemporary climate change litigation. Lawsuits 
                                               
39 See infra Part III. 
40 Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal Law of Attorney Ethics, 29 GA. L. REV. 
137, 148 (1994). 
41 Alex Bein, Writing the Rules of Attorney-Whistleblowing: Who Gets to Decide and 
How Do We Make the Decision?, 42 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 967, 1001 (2015). 
42 Model Rule 1.6(b) is phrased as a permissible disclosure. But several states have 
mandatory disclosure rules. Moreover, even permissible disclosure might be made 
mandatory by operation of companion rules. See infra Part III. 
43 Irma S. Russell, Unreasonable Risk: Model Rule 1.6, Environmental Hazards, and 
Positive Law, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 117, 168–69 (1998) [hereinafter Russell, 
Unreasonable Risk]. 
44 Keith W. Rizzardi has an excellent piece on the applications of attorney ethical 
responsibilities to making factual statements about climate change impacts. Keith Rizzardi, 
Sea Level Lies: The Duty to Confront the Deniers, 44 STETSON L. REV. 75, 75 (2014). 
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that have sought to compel government action on climate change often face standing 
barriers, which prompts many courts to dismiss climate litigation for perceived lack 
of remedy.45 Because ethics complaint systems are primarily conducted within state 
bars and do not have many of the same formal requirements as bringing an action in 
court, there are less barriers to bringing about the intended changes. 
Just as attorneys who worked in the tobacco industry were assailed under legal 
and ethical standards as more information about tobacco products and marketing 
came to light,46 attorneys representing clients in far larger sectors associated with 
greenhouse gas emissions—such as energy generation, transportation, and fossil fuel 
extraction and refining—may find themselves in ethical crosshairs that many never 
realized existed.  
Part I of this Article examines Rule 1.6(b)(1) of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, its variation among the states, and related model ethics rules. 
Part I then breaks down the various components that must be present under Rule 
1.6(b)(1) in order to trigger the rule in a particular state, Texas. Part II examines how 
specific client greenhouse gas emissions activity may be considered criminal or 
fraudulent, even in jurisdictions (including the majority of the United States) where 
greenhouse gases are ostensibly unregulated. These factual scenarios include 
emitting greenhouse gases without a permit, failure to quantify and report emissions, 
failure to fully disclose financial risk from greenhouse gas-related activities in 
corporate filings, and failure to provide, request, or utilize accurate information 
regarding the social cost of carbon in environmental reviews in federal or state 
permitting situations. Part III examines the requirement of the possibility of 
reasonably certain death or bodily harm and shows that this can be met in numerous 
situations with greenhouse gas emissions. Part III then examines how the ABA 
Model Rules and similar state rules have been interpreted so that the death or bodily 
injury need not be traceable to a specific individual, nor be immediate in its harm, 
and why reporting would alleviate the threat. Part IV explains how easily ethical 
complaints could be brought under the theories developed in Parts I–III, and the 
Article concludes with a warning for attorneys to be prepared or risk their 
professional careers. 
This Article serves as an opening chapter to the application of state attorney 
ethics rules to lawyers who represent clients that contribute to climate change. There 
are many aspects of the concept that merit further exploration. Future articles will 
explore more fully the application of this theory to the specific case of government 
                                               
45 Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon-Mobil, Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (concluding that because of the political question doctrine and lack of standing 
under Article III, the case must be dismissed), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849, 857–58 
(9th Cir. 2012); Comer v. Murphy Oil, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 862 (S.D. Miss. 2012) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s claims lacked standing because their alleged injuries were not 
fairly traceable to the defendants conduct), aff’d, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).  
46 Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota 
Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 499 (1999). 
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attorneys, and other authors are examining the intersection of climate change and 
the normative ethical requirements of attorneys. 
 
II.  ABA MODEL RULE 1.6(B)(1): CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY  
AND DISCLOSING DANGER 
 
Every state has a code of ethical conduct for attorneys.47 The ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct have influenced states’ rules to varying extents.48 Rule 
1.6(b)(1) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the various state 
versions based on it, require that an attorney either may or must disclose client 
behavior “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”49 Or, in 
an earlier version adopted by many states, disclosure is triggered if the client 
commits a crime that could result in “imminent death or substantial bodily harm.”50  
ABA Model Rule 1.6 sets out the general obligation of attorneys to protect 
client confidentiality.51 The requirement of client confidentiality is considered a 
“bedrock” foundation of justice.52 Rule 1.6 provides that a lawyer “shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by” designated exceptions.53 The ethical 
prohibition against breach of client confidentiality is distinct from the attorney-client 
                                               
47 See Todd A. Berger, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer 
Redux: The New Three Hardest Questions, 7 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 
96, 104 & n.24 (2017) (noting that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are the 
basis for formal ethics rules in every state except California, which has its own set of rules 
for professional conduct). 
48 Id. 
49 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer may 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm; (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance 
of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services; (3) to prevent, mitigate or 
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably 
certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance 
of which the client has used the lawyer’s services . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
50 RUSSELL G. PEARCE ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH 363 (3d ed. 2017); Russell, Unreasonable Risk, supra note 43, at 127. 
51 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6; see also Russell, Unreasonable Risk, 
supra note 43, at 124. 
52 Gary Rowe, Note, Potential Expansion, or Modification, to the Permissive 
Exceptions of Model Rule 1.6: Client-Lawyer Confidentiality in Criminal Law and “The 
Gap,” 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 291, 295 (2015). 
53 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a); see also PEARCE ET AL., supra note 50, 
at 363. 
 
580 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
privilege.54 In some cases, when ethical rules require or allow attorney disclosure to 
prevent harm, the attorney-client privilege may also be waived—though there is 
wide variation among the states.55  
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information is broad, despite 
the exceptions.56 As this Part will discuss in detail, attorneys must balance the 
requirement of client confidentiality with the importance of the exceptions to the 
requirement—including the exceptions provided in Model Rule 1.6(b), as well as 
other rules—and the variation of this model rule in the states.57 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) provides that an attorney may reveal her client’s 
confidential information “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm.”58 The ABA changed this rule in 2002 from the prior disclosure exception “to 
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely 
to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.”59 This change broadened the 
exception and made clearer its application to accidental dangers.60 
Every state has adopted some form of the “death or substantial bodily harm” 
exception, although some states have retained the pre-2002 qualifier that the 
exception is only triggered by a client’s criminal act.61 Twelve states mandate 
disclosure, while thirty-seven states permit disclosure.62 Massachusetts has a hybrid 
version.63 Of the states that mandate disclosure, five (Florida, Illinois, North Dakota, 
Tennessee, and Washington) mandate disclosure if an attorney “reasonably believes 
that a client’s actions may result in reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm.”64 Seven states, including New Jersey, Connecticut, and Texas, have a form 
of this rule that mandates disclosure if there is a likelihood of death or substantial 
bodily injury when it results from a possible criminal or fraudulent act. For instance, 
Rule 1.05(e) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct states: 
 
When a lawyer has confidential information clearly establishing that a 
client is likely to commit a criminal or fraudulent act that is likely to result 
                                               
54 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 50, at 295; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
1.6(a) cmt. 3.  
55 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct 55:1004 (ABA/BNA, Bloomberg Law 2019); see, e.g., 
Aviles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Tex. App. 2005) (“We hold that this communication 
of an intent to commit a crime is not covered by the attorney-client privilege . . . .”). 
56 Russell, Unreasonable Risk, supra note 43, at 124. 
57 PEARCE ET AL., supra note 50, at 291. 
58 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1). 
59 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2001); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002); see also Russell, Unreasonable Risk, 
supra note 43, at 123. 
60 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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in death or substantial bodily harm to a person, the lawyer shall reveal 
confidential information to the extent revelation reasonably appears 
necessary to prevent the client from committing the criminal or fraudulent 
act.65 
 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) does not exist in a vacuum and must be interpreted with 
other ethical rules as well. For example, ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer 
may not assist a client in the commission of a crime or fraud.66 All states have 
adopted a version of Rule 1.2(d).67 ABA Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) provides that a 
lawyer must withdraw from representing a client if continuing representation would 
violate any ethics rule.68 Thus, if a lawyer’s conduct would assist a client in the 
commission of a crime or fraud, the lawyer must withdraw. Moreover, Model Rule 
4.1(b) provides that: 
 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: . . .  
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is 
prohibited by Rule 1.6.69 
 
This suggests that, in certain circumstances, an attorney must disclose 
information due to Model Rule 4.1(b), even if the state’s version of Model Rule 1.6 
merely permits disclosure. Thus, even in the thirty-seven states that merely permit 
disclosure, there is the possibility that the operation of the state’s Rule 4.1(b) 
equivalent will then require disclosure. 
Many states have also adopted ABA Model Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3),70 
which require disclosure of a client’s criminal (and sometimes fraudulent) acts that 
                                               
65 TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(e) (1989).  
66 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
67 Harris Weinstein, Client Confidences and the Rules of Professional Responsibility: 
Too Little Consensus and Too Much Confusion, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 727, 735–36 (1994). 
68 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1). 
69 Id. r. 4.1(b). 
70 Information may be disclosed to: 
 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably 
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's 
services; 
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the 
client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used 
the lawyer's services; . . . . 
 
Id. r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3). 
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cause economic damage, even if such acts would not be expected to result in death 
or serious bodily harm.71  
The states vary in how they interpret the extent of either the requirement or the 
privilege to disclose information, both in the extent of the disclosure and in how 
certain the attorney has to be concerning the criminal actions or death or substantial 
bodily harm.72 Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) limits disclosure to what is necessary to prevent 
the harm.73 The related exception in Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) allowing 
disclosure for criminal or fraudulent acts are limited to the extent necessary to 
“prevent, mitigate or rectify” the client’s wrongful acts “in furtherance of which the 
client has used the lawyer’s services.”74 In Texas, the requirement to disclose is 
predicated upon the attorney having “information ‘clearly establishing’ the 
likelihood of such acts and consequences.”75 In evaluating the disclosure 
requirement in its Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) equivalent (Rule 1.05(e)), Texas defers to 
how the situation “reasonably appears” to the lawyer, and also protects the attorney’s 
disclosure by operation of the lesser standard to allow (rather than mandate) 
disclosure under the separate “criminal or fraudulent” act exception noted above.76 
Because the purpose is to avoid harm, disclosures are theoretically limited to 
what is necessary to prevent a future or continuing occurrence, rather than to simply 
announce client actions or violations that have wholly occurred in the past.77 
Ongoing violations that will continue the harm would thus be subject to the 
disclosure rule. In terms of past events, related ethical rules governing prohibitions 
against attorney assistance in illegal or fraudulent activity can allow or require 
disclosure if the attorney was involved in the action.78 The ethical rule prohibiting 
                                               
71 Weinstein, supra note 67, at 736. The model rules added this expanded disclosure 
exception in 2002 as a response to multiple recent corporate frauds, such as Enron. ABA, A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT, 1982–2013 139–42 (2013) [hereinafter “ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY”]. 
Additionally, in any state, the failure to disclose information about harms may make an 
attorney liable in tort if there is a specific victim of the harm. See generally Kevin H. Michels, 
Third-Party Negligence Claims Against Counsel: A Proposed Unified Liability Standard, 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 143 (Winter 2009) (addressing when attorneys are liable to nonclients 
for negligence). Though specific tort claims in greenhouse gas emissions may be unlikely. 
See discussion infra Part III. 
72 See infra Appendix A. 
73 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1); see also Laws. Man. on Prof. 
Conduct, supra note 55, at 55:1002; Connecticut Informal Ethics Op. 08-06; Maryland Ethics 
Op. 94-27 (1994). 
74 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2), 1.6(b)(3); see also Laws. Man. 
on Prof. Conduct, supra note 55, at 55:905. 
75 TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.05 (c)(4) cmt. (1989). 
76 Id. 
77 See McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1245 (9th Cir. 2003). 
78 For example, Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) allows disclosure when the lawyer believes such 
disclosure is reasonably necessary to “mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that . . . has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime 
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attorney assistance in criminal or fraudulent acts may also come into play if 
subsequent occurrences render prior actions newly illegal.79 
To recap, depending upon the state, an attorney must or may disclose 
confidential information in situations where the attorney reasonably believes the 
disclosure is necessary to avoid some form of danger of potential death or serious 
bodily harm.80 Further, the states vary in whether or not they require disclosure only 
if death or substantial bodily harm would result from a client’s fraudulent or criminal 
act.81  
Though most states have a Model Rule 4.1(b) counterpart which prohibits 
attorney actions aiding a criminal or fraudulent act,82 these rules do not address 
situations in which an attorney merely has knowledge of—and has done nothing to 
actively aid—a client’s activity that is criminal, fraudulent, or likely to result in death 
or substantial bodily harm. This can occur in two distinct situations. First, the 
attorney may be aware of dangerous criminal or fraudulent actions because they 
occur without or despite attorney advice. For example, an attorney may advise a 
client to follow Clean Air Act reporting requirements, but the client might demur. 
Since the Clean Air Act requirements apply to the permittee itself rather than on any 
person with knowledge of the permittee’s emissions, the attorney would herself not 
have aided a criminal act.83  
In the second situation, the ethics rule prohibiting an attorney from engaging in 
criminal or fraudulent activity is narrower than what a non-attorney might consider 
fraudulent or criminal activity. For instance, an attorney’s zealous representation of 
a client or legal advice based on an interpretation of whether something is legal does 
not mean that the attorney has committed criminal or fraudulent activity under this 
ethical rule.84 In other words, as Professors Riesel and Treanor note:  
 
This prohibition [on knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit 
a crime] does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about 
the actual consequences that appear likely to result from the client’s 
                                               
or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services . . . .”). MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(3). In addition, Model Rule 1.16(b)(3) provides that “a 
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if the client has used the lawyer’s services 
to perpetrate a crime or fraud.” Id. Further, Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) requires withdrawal if the 
representation will result in a violation or rules or other law. Id. r. 1.16(a)(1); see also Laws 
Man. on Prof. Conduct, supra note 55, at 55:905; TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.05 (c)(4) cmt. (1989). 
79 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 10.  
80 See supra notes 47–79 and accompanying text; Pearce, supra note 53, at 363. 
81 Laws Man. on Prof. Conduct, supra note 55, at 55:902; Aviles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 
437, 439 (Tex. App. 2005); Russell, supra note 29, at 124. 
82 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(b). 
83 Daniel Riesel & Victoria Shiah Treanor, Ethical considerations for the Clean Air Act 
Attorney, 30(5) THE PRACTICAL REAL EST. LAW. 5, 9 (Sept. 2014). 
84 See Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. 2015). 
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conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action 
that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course 
of action.85 
 
However, even if an attorney’s advice on particular laws may be shielded from 
attorney ethics obligations, that is unrelated to whether the client later commits a 
criminal or fraudulent act which causes harm that can be rectified by disclosure. 
This Article cannot cover every permutation of these rules in the diversity of 
states. Instead, an analysis of the law in Texas, which has of one of the narrowest 
rules about mandated disclosure, will demonstrate that even when the rule is 
restricted to actions that derive from criminal or fraudulent acts, an attorney could 
face ethical disclosure requirements with client decisions regarding the emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If the Texas standard is satisfied, the requirements in 11 other 
states would potentially require disclosure as well. Further, even in the 37 permissive 
disclosure states, clients who emit greenhouse gases would still need to be concerned 
about the potential disclosure of this behavior. 
The remainder of this Article uses the elements of the Texas version of Model 
Rule 1.6(b)(1) as an outline to provide an in-depth discussion of the rule’s 
applicability to greenhouse gas emissions in many states. In Texas, disclosure of 
confidential information under the Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) exception requires the 
presence of three elements: 1) a criminal or fraudulent act that is 2) likely to result 
in death or substantial bodily harm 3) that could be prevented by the disclosure.86 
Part III discusses the applicability of the first element to greenhouse gas-related 
activities in and Part IV applies the second and third elements to harms caused by 
such activities. 
 
III.  CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT ACTIONS RELATED TO GREENHOUSE  
GAS EMISSIONS 
 
A.  Criminal Actions Related to Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
1.  Unauthorized Emissions 
 
When exactly would a client’s emission of greenhouse gases be considered 
criminal or fraudulent? Federal laws have criminalized a wide range of harms to the 
environment, such as certain unauthorized disposals or emissions, or knowing 
                                               
85 Riesel & Treanor, supra note 83, at 13 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 1.2 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)).  
86 TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.05(e) (2019). Note that the Texas 
rule mandates that the act be criminal or fraudulent and requires disclosure while the new 
Model Rule does not mandate criminal or fraudulent activity but is permissive. Texas does 
not require that the death be “imminent,” as some states do, though this Article will 
demonstrate how this is not necessarily a substantial restriction on the application of the 
disclosure rules. 
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failure to keep or report proper information. For example, the Clean Water Act, a 
typical statute, establishes four categories of criminal violations for unauthorized 
discharges of pollutants into waters of the United States: negligent violations, 
knowing violations, knowing endangerments, and knowing false statements.87 
Although there is no general federal greenhouse gas limitation for emissions 
sources, several states have adopted such standards. California and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) states88 limit the emission of greenhouse gases 
by specific entities in certain circumstances. In these states, similar to federal 
environmental laws regulating other pollutants, emissions may occur but only 
pursuant to the terms of a valid permit.89 The emitting entities are also responsible 
for properly tracking and surrendering their emission permits at the appropriate 
time.90 This applies to all fossil fuel-fired power plants in the RGGI states, as well 
as multiple greenhouse gas emission sectors in California.91  
This Article will expand on California’s system as an economy-wide program. 
California’s program includes very specific limitations and penalties. The California 
greenhouse gas cap and trade program sets an emissions cap that declines every 
year.92 Covered entities include large emitters, like heavy industry and power 
generators, and smaller emitters, like commercial natural gas producers and 
transportation fuel providers.93 Under this program, each covered entity has an 
emissions allowance for every metric ton of carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) that 
the source emits.94 Allowances are allocated to an entity by the government or 
                                               
87 Clean Water Act §§ 309(c)(1)–(4), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)–(4) (2018). 
88 Currently Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, New York, Delaware, and Maryland. New Jersey may also rejoin. Dana Bate, New 
Jersey looks to rejoin regional cap-and-trade program, STATEIMPACT PA. (Jan. 24, 2019, 
9:14 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2019/01/24/new-jersey-looks-to-rejoin-
regional-cap-and-trade-program/ [https://perma.cc/B8ZH-WJ4G]. 
89 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95820 (2019); REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
MODEL RULE § XX-1.5, 3.1 (2017); For the statutory requirements of individual RGGI 
participant states, see State Statutes & Regulations, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
(2019), https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/state-regulations. [https://perm 
a.cc/EYT4-GJZB]. 
90 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95856 (2019); REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
MODEL RULE § XX-6.5(b) (2017). 
91 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95101 (2019); REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
MODEL RULE §XX-1.4 (REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 2017). At the time of this 
writing, several other states (such as Washington) are considering some sort of greenhouse 
gas permitting requirement. 
92 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95891(e)(1) (2019). 
93 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811 (2019). 
94 See Cal. Air Res. Bd., Proposed Amendments to the California Cap on Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions and Market Based Compliance Mechanisms Regulation: Final 
Environmental Analysis Dec. 10, 2018, at 3, https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/regact/2018/capandtrade 
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acquired through trading, auctions, or offset projects.95 Penalties for failing to 
comply with California’s emissions permitting are steep, requiring payment of fines 
that are four times the permitting cost.96 
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is given strong enforcement 
authority under the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, commonly 
referred to as AB 32, to ensure that the cap and trade program operates 
successfully.97 CARB has the power to enjoin and set penalties for any violations by 
covered entities.98 AB 32 applies the same criminal penalties that are used to enforce 
non-vehicular air pollution requirements under Division 26 of the Healthy and 
Safety Code (“Code”).99 Criminal penalties under this division include fines and 
imprisonment, depending on factors like level of knowledge, type of harm, and 
individual or corporate status.100 For example, under Section 42400.3.5 of the Code:  
 
[a]ny person who knowingly violates any rule, regulation, permit, order, 
fee requirement, or filing requirement of the state board or of a district . . . 
that is adopted for the control of toxic air contaminants . . . is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars 
($10,000) or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, 
or both.101  
 
Willful or intentional emissions of air pollutants in violation of AB 32 have 
even more stringent criminal penalties.102 Such a person “is guilty of a misdemeanor 
and is punishable by a fine of not more than seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000), 
or imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine and 
imprisonment.”103 Additionally, there are several other criminal provisions related 
to negligent emissions of air pollutants, failure to take corrective action, and a 
general criminal provision for any violations.104 In conclusion, CARB is given a 
number of enforcement tools, including criminal penalties, that enable it to 
effectively implement the requirements of AB 32’s ambitious cap and trade 
program.105 
                                               
18/finalea.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8S9-KR9K]. A carbon dioxide equivalent emission is the 
greenhouse effect of any greenhouse gas expressed in multiple of the same effect from CO2 
emissions. 
95 Id. 
96 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95857(b)(2). 
97 Id. 
98 Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38580 (Deering 2018). 
99 HEALTH & SAFETY § 38580. 
100 HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 42400–42400.3.5. 
101 HEALTH & SAFETY § 42400.3.5(a). 
102 HEALTH & SAFETY § 42400.3(a). 
103 Id.  
104 HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 42400–42400.2. 
105 See generally HEALTH & SAFETY § 38580. 
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In addition, greenhouse gas emissions outside of the United States are subject 
to legal requirements in specific jurisdictions. As of 2017, sixty-seven jurisdictions, 
including the European Union, China, Japan, and New Zealand, either currently or 
soon will require permits for the emission of greenhouse gases.106 Moreover, in some 
countries, the removal of or a detrimental impact on carbon sinks (such as 
rainforests) may be considered criminal acts, as in Brazil.107 
 
2.  Failure to Report Emissions 
 
In states which limit greenhouse gas emissions, such as California, there are 
extensive rules governing emissions reporting.108 Outside of California and the 
RGGI states there are also federal greenhouse gas emissions reporting requirements, 
even though there are no direct federal greenhouse gas emissions controls.  
The U.S. EPA requires entities of certain sizes to report their greenhouse gas 
emissions or face various penalties.109 In a rule finalized in October 2009, the EPA 
required that 30 categories of stationary sources must report their greenhouse gas 
emissions every year.110 Some must report any emissions, and others must only 
report emissions of over 25,000 tons per year of CO2-equivalent.111 
The EPA promulgated this regulation pursuant to Sections 114 and 208 of the 
Clean Air Act.112 Section 113(c)(1) criminalizes any knowing violations of Section 
114’s recordkeeping, monitoring, and inspection requirements.113 Interestingly, 
multiple entities have already apparently violated this requirement, though they have 
yet to face significant enforcement.114 Failure to enforce, however, has no bearing 
on whether or not an action (or inaction) would be considered criminal for purposes 
of attorney ethics rules.115 Because the sections of the Clean Air Act mentioned 
                                               
106 See RICHARD ZECHTER ET AL., WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON 
PRICING 10–12 (2017), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2851 
0/wb_report_171027.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/6MFF-RLNF].  
107 Nicholas S. Bryner, Brazil’s Green Court: Environmental Law in the Superior 
Tribunal de Justiça (High Court of Brazil), 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 470, 507–08 (2012). 
108 See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit.17, §§ 95101–95103, 95111, 95115, 95118, 
95152–95153 (2019).  
109 See generally 40 C.F.R. Part 98 (2019). 
110 Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56260, 56374 (Oct. 30, 
2009) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. §§ 98.1–98.9 (2019)). 
111 40 C.F.R. § 98.2 (2019). 
112 Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56263. 
113 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(c), 7414 (2018). 
114 Victor Flatt et al., Governance 102: Understanding the Legal/Policy Landscape & 
Determining the Best Strategy for Your Organization, ASSOCIATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
OFFICERS (ACCO) (July 18–20, 2016). 
115 Cf. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.05(e) (2019), 
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDis
play.cfm&ContentID=27271 [https://perma.cc./HB9A-BDSP] (requiring that a lawyer 
“shall reveal confidential information to the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary 
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above also require records to be “maintained,” if a reporting requirement has been 
violated, the crime may still exist until that violation is remedied.116 Federal law is 
currently split on whether the failure to report emissions under the Clean Air Act is 
a one-time violation or whether the violation continues until the failure to report is 
corrected.117 Some courts view a party’s failure to report a known violation as a 
continuing violation that begins when the defendant is initially obligated to self-
report its non-compliance and only ends on the day when the defendant reports its 
violation.118 Thus, even when a violation is simply a failure to report, there could 
still be ongoing harm that requires disclosure.119 
 
B.  Fraudulent Actions Related to Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
Fraud is defined generally as a knowing “material misrepresentation” for the 
purpose of inducing behavior.120 The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct define fraud as conduct that is furthered by using intentionally untrue 
statements or with a purpose to deceive.121 Many companies have been accused of 
posting misleading or untrue statements about the impact of greenhouse gas 
emissions on the company’s bottom line.122 
                                               
to prevent the client from committing the criminal or fraudulent act”). In other words, this is 
a prospective or preventative requirement, lacking any ties to whether the government has 
sought to enforce or will seek to enforce the client’s indiscretions.  
116 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(A); see also James Miskiewicz & John S. Rudd, Civil and 
Criminal Enforcement of the Clean Air Act After 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
281, 336–37 (1992). 
117 Ivan Lieben, Catch Me If You Can – The Misapplication of the Federal Statute of 
Limitations to Clean Air Act PSD Permit Program Violations, 38 ENVTL. L. 667, 668 (2008) 
(discussing how “numerous courts ruling on this issue have been sharply divided”).  
118 JOEL MINTZ ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 149 
(2007) (citing United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 338, 353 (E.D. Va. 1997) 
(holding that for each day the facility had incomplete records in violation of the Clean Water 
Act, additional fines were added)). 
119 Even if a violation is wholly past, failure to report may allow or encourage emissions 
of more greenhouse gases that contribute to harm, meeting the “prevent harm” standard. 
120 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 10 (AM. LAW. 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014). 
121 TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT, Terminology at 8 (“‘Fraud’ or 
‘Fraudulent’ denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent 
misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.”). 
122 Irina Ivanova, Investors Say Facebook, Tesla, and Many Other Companies Are 
Hiding Climate Impact, CBS NEWS (June 17, 2019, 8:24 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/climate-change-700-companies-tesla-amazon-facebook-carbon-footprin [https://perm 
a.cc/K8JT-2298]; Danielle Haynes, New York AG Sues Exxon Mobil for Misleading 
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Attorney ethics cases can give “fraudulent” a broad meaning. For example, 
under Texas’s attorney ethics rules, a corporate client’s breach of a fiduciary duty to 
creditors is considered fraudulent for purposes of the disclosure exception.123 
The federal Securities Act of 1933 requires that investors in publicly traded 
companies receive all material information about those securities and prohibits 
deceit, misrepresentation, and any fraud related to the sales of such securities.124 
Thus, mischaracterizing or failing to include material information on a required 
report or document may be a fraudulent act. According to a seminal U.S. Supreme 
Court case: 
 
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, 
involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a 
reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation of a general test of 
materiality occur in the articulation of just how significant a fact must be 
or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact would affect a 
reasonable investor’s judgment.125 
 
In the early 1970s, the SEC noted that environmental regulation could be 
important to a company’s business prospects and required disclosure of these 
regulations that were material.126 In 2010, an SEC interpretive guidance document 
addressed disclosure requirements related to the impact of public companies’ 
operations and products on greenhouse gas emissions.127 In this guidance, the SEC 
noted that climate change risks could affect company value through asset exposure 
as well as through regulation.128 Because of investment in companies that profit from 
fossil fuel sales, the financial risks of a quick move away from fossil fuels could also 
cause financial disruption across a wide array of companies.129 In September 2018, 
the United Kingdom’s banking governor, Mark Carney, again sounded the alarm on 
risks of economic impacts from a fossil fuel transition to the financial stability of 
banks.130 
                                               
123 Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Texas, Texas Ethics Op. 603 (2010), 
https://www.legalethicstexas.com/Ethics-Resources/Opinions/Opinion-603 [https://perma. 
cc/9DX6-ETSX]. 
124 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a)(4)–(5) (2018). 
125 T.S.C. Industries, Inc. v. Northway Industries, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976). 
126 Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 6290, 6292 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
127 See generally id. 
128 Id. at 6291. 
129 TOM SANZILLO ET AL., INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS, THE FINANCIAL 
CASE FOR FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT 4–5 (2018), http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018 
/07/Divestment-from-Fossil-Fuels_The-Financial-Case_July-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/56 
N4-WKCH]. 
130 Benjamin Hulac, Climate Is ‘Mainstream’ Risk in Banks, Regulator Says, E&E 
NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/09/27/ 
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After the publication of the SEC’s 2010 guidance, many companies did include 
climate change reporting in disclosure documents.131 But in 2016, the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board found that compliance in these first few years had been 
limited and was “mostly boilerplate,” especially with respect to regulatory risks.132 
Further, the Trump Administration revoked the 2010 guidance.133 However, this 
guidance revocation does not repeal the statutory requirement that all material risks, 
including any risks from climate change, be disclosed. Further, the maturation of 
understanding of the risks of climate change means the disclosure requirements may 
be expanding rather than shrinking. In fact, reports of companies’ disclosures in 
recent years reflect such an expanding interpretation. The private Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosure reported in 2018 that more and more 
companies are expanding the breadth of what they disclose, and especially 
disclosure of financial risk from climate change regulation.134 
In addition to SEC disclosure requirements, greenhouse gas disclosure 
requirements could be required under state anti-fraud statutes.135 In 2015, the New 
York State Attorney General moved aggressively to demand more climate-related 
regulatory and legal risk disclosure to comply with the New York anti-fraud 
statute136 and investigated ExxonMobil for possibly lying to investors about climate 
change risk.137 As noted above, this investigation led to an indictment of 
                                               
stories/1060099897 [https://perma.cc/5UPZ-VYYJ]. 
131 SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, CLIMATE RISK TECHNICAL 
BULLETIN 86–87 (2016), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/10/20/document_cw_01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7U7R-L6GR].  
132 Id. 
133 See Caitlin Meagher, Leaving Investors in the Dark: The SEC’s Growing Silence on 
Guidance Related to the Business and Legal Developments on Climate Change, GEO. ENVTL. 
L. REV. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/environmental-law-review/blog/ 
leaving-investors-in-the-dark-the-secs-growing-silence-on-guidance-related-to-the-business 
-and-legal-developments-on-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/5M48-EDKJ]. 
134 TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-
RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES: STATUS REPORT 1 (2018), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/FINAL-2018-TCFD-Status-Report-092518.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EWL2-UWXE]. 
135 Tom Mounteer et al., Dialogue, Informing Investors of Climate Risk: The Impact of 
Securities Laws in the Environmental Context, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10455, 
10455 (2016). 
136 Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352, 352-C (McKinney 2019). 
137 Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible Climate 




2020] DISCLOSING THE DANGER 591 
ExxonMobil for intentionally deceiving its shareholders and investors about the 
various financial risks posed to the company by climate change regulations.138  
The decision not to disclose information or provide misinformation may also 
be considered fraud in some circumstances. In the wave of litigation against tobacco 
companies during the 1990s, attorneys were involved in schemes to shield relevant 
information by attorney-client privilege.139 In those cases, the very attempt at 
shielding was determined to be fraudulent because it was designed to keep material 
information from going public.140 
Legal scholars who have recently analyzed this question opine that the answer 
to whether assisting in deliberate misinformation by a client violates ethics rules is 
“frustratingly opaque.”141 Though uncertain, considering the aggressive stances of 
some state attorneys general,142 in at least some circumstances, an attorney’s 
assistance or knowledge of the misstatement or failure to state relevant facts could 
be an ethics violation, even without the requirement to report a client activity that 
would endanger human health. 
In sum, failure to have proper emissions permits, failure to report emissions 
pursuant to EPA and state rules, and failure to adequately report financial risk from 
a firm’s greenhouse gas emissions or impacts could be considered criminal, 
fraudulent, or both.143 
 
C.  The Special Case of the Government Regulatory Attorney 
 
What of the attorney at the EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards 
in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina? Even defining the client is difficult: 
 
                                               
138 Schwartz, supra note 18. In December 2019, the court ruled against the state of New 
York on its claim that Exxon violated the Martin Act. See Schwartz, New York Loses Climate 
Change Fraud Case, supra note 18. 
State anti-fraud statutes could also apply to greenhouse gas offset sales if the offsets do 
not deliver reductions as advertised and the purveyor knew or had reason to know this. See, 
e.g., Alan Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 HASTINGS W. 
NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 109, 148 (2014) (discussing potential fraud in California offsets). 
139 Ciresi et al., supra note 46, at 499. 
140 Id. at 498–99. 
141 Katrina Fischer Kuh, Malignant Normality, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK 
(Nov. 11, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2018/11/malignant-
normality.html [https://perma.cc/78E6-W884]. 
142 See Gillis & Krauss, supra note 137. 
143 In addition to U.S. reporting requirements, significant requirements exist in other 
jurisdictions in which large American corporations do business. For example, the European 
Union’s Non-financial Reporting Directive (Directive 2014/95/EU) mandates disclosure of 
greenhouse gas emissions without regarding to financial materiality. GRI & CSR EUROPE, 
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For example, the client of the government lawyer can be characterized as 
the public as a whole, the government as a whole, the branch of 
government served by the lawyer, an agency or entity advised by the 
lawyer, or an officer or decision-maker advised by the lawyer.144 
 
Regardless of whoever the client is, attorney ethics rules apply to government 
attorneys as well.145 Moreover, the issue here is not so much the disclosure of a 
change in government policy regarding dangerous greenhouse gas emissions—in 
our example, that information would most likely be public. But the attorney may 
have non-public information that, if known, could make the rulemaking (and the 
concomitant increase in greenhouse gases) less likely. For example, the attorney 
may have information (such as internal debates or outside influences) related to the 
rulemaking discussed in the introduction that might violate the APA or enabling 
statute. Similarly, the extensive suppression of scientific information under the 
Trump Administration that is often required for rulemaking146 might merit 
disclosure, as it would impact final agency decisions and court rulings on such 
decisions. In any event, even if a government attorney had no new information to 
disclose, ethics might impose an obligation to withdraw,147 which could accomplish 
much the same purpose of stymying the improper action. 
Does misstating or omitting information during federal notice-and-comment 
rulemaking rise to the level of “criminal or fraudulent activity”? In most cases in the 
history of the U.S. administrative state, the answer to this question would surely 
have been “no,” simply because of the difficulty in defining misinformation. Even 
as various presidential administrations have sought to bring about their own policy 
priorities through interpretations of existing rules, the worst that was said before the 
Trump Administration was that the proposed rule was not consistent with the statute. 
For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the Bush 
Administration’s proposed changes to the Routine Maintenance Repair Exception 
(RMRR) in New Source Review under the Clean Air Act violates the Clean Air 
                                               
144 Rizzardi, supra note 44, at 76 (revealing that the question of who government 
attorneys represent is a controversial one under ethics law); see Nancy Leong, Attorney-
Client Privilege in the Public Sector: A Survey of Government Attorneys, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 163, 163 (2007) (discussing whether attorney-client privilege extends to government 
entities). 
145 Rizzardi, supra note 44, at 76. 
146 See JACOB CARTER ET AL., CTR. FOR SCIENCE & DEMOCRACY AT THE UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE STATE OF SCIENCE IN THE TRUMP ERA 1, 10–13 (2019), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2019/01/ucs-trump-2yrs-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KA76-TFFE]. 
147 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) 
(requiring withdrawal or termination of representation if continuing “the representation will 
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law”). 
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Act.148 Many scholars have argued that the Obama Administration’s Clean Power 
Plan (CPP) also exceeded statutory authority, but no appellate court decision has 
been rendered on that specific claim as of March 2020.149 But while political actors 
may use hyperbolic words such as “usurpation” of authority, none have 
characterized these actions as criminal or illegal.150 
As in many other ways, it is possible that the Trump Administration is different 
and has crossed a line in determining the social cost of carbon in the new climate 
change rule for power plants discussed in the introduction or in other rulemakings. 
Much evidence exists that many administrative actions taken by various agencies 
under the Trump Administration are done with complete knowledge that they are 
neither legally tenable nor factually accurate.151 The Trump Administration is also 
the first to retain business entanglements in the White House.152 While the U.S. 
Supreme Court has shown little appetite for tarnishing government policy because 
of President Trump’s intent,153 it is unknown how any number of state supreme 
courts would view some of the Trump Administration’s activities. 
                                               
148 New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert denied, 550 U.S. 928 
(2007). 
149 See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29593 (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. 17, 2019) (dismissing set of cases initiated in 2015 challenging CPP as moot because 
of forthcoming EPA rulemaking that will repeal and replace the CPP); see also Repeal of 
Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019); Juan Carlos Rodriguez, EPA Poised 
to Replace Clean Power Plan, DC Circ. Hears, LAW360 (Sept. 17, 2018, 8:45 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1083348 [https://perma.cc/UEX7-633V] (“The litigation 
has been on hold since April 2017, when the D.C. Circuit issued its first 60-day stay.”); 
Petition for Review, at 2, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir., 2015) (No. 15-1363), 
https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/File-stamped%20petition%2015-1363 
%20(M0108546xCECC6).pdf [https://perma.cc/SN3N-GXKX] (arguing that “Petitioners 
will show that the final rule is in excess of the agency’s statutory authority, goes beyond the 
bounds set by the United States Constitution, and otherwise is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion and not in accordance with law.”). 
150 See, e.g., Sabrina Siddiqui, Marco Rubio Attacks EPA and Pledges to Reverse Key 
Obama Climate Moves, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/sep/02/marco-rubio-energy-policy-epa-climate-change [https://perma.cc/Q4L2-
FAUN] (finding that: “You can read [the Clean Power Plan] as a usurpation of states’ 
rights.”). 
151 Tal Axelrod, Tillerson: Trump Would Ask Me to Do Things I Couldn’t Legally Do, 
THE HILL (Dec. 7, 2018, 9:42 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/420221-
tillerson-trump-would-ask-me-to-do-things-that-i-couldnt-legally-do [https://perma.cc/6JS 
C-5DF7]. 
152 David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Trump’s Corruption: The Definitive List, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/opinion/trump-
administration-corruption-conflicts.html [https://perma.cc/RZZ8-XEJQ]. 
153 See Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Trump’s Travel Ban Is Upheld by Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/politics/supre 
me-court-trump-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/8LSV-6RLN]. But see Adam Liptak, 
Supreme Court Leaves Census Question on Citizenship in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 
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In his seminal article on climate science and public officials, Professor Rizzardi 
noted that it should be a clear ethical violation for an attorney to deliberately misstate 
accepted scientific facts about climate change.154 Attorneys are the primary drafters 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking.155 If these same government attorneys would be 
considered as assisting in spreading disinformation by rulemaking they may face a 
responsibility to withdraw from representation or be in violation of ethical rules.156 
 
IV.  LIKELY TO RESULT IN DEATH OR SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM THAT IS 
PREVENTABLE 
 
A.  The Harms from Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
Even if a particular facility that emits greenhouse gases is a small contributor 
to the overall amount of greenhouse gases in the air, there is no doubt that climate 
change as a whole will create the danger of death and substantial bodily injury. 
Overall, the process of global warming has been strongly linked to future serious 
harm to persons across the globe. According to the Climate Vulnerability Monitor, 
climate change is estimated to kill over 400,000 persons worldwide every year, and 
the total number of deaths attributable to carbon pollution (including deaths from air 
pollution and workers, for example) raises the toll to 4.5 million.157 These direct and 
indirect climate change impacts can be explored in several different categories. 
 
1.  Direct Human Health Impacts 
 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report 
on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
temperature levels (“IPCC Report”), there is no question that any increase in global 
temperatures will affect human health.158 Specifically, if global average 
                                               
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/politics/census-citizenship-question-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/YC9U-698K] (noting that the Supreme Court did look 
beneath the proffered reason for the Trump administration action).  
154 Rizzardi, supra note 44, at 116. 
155 Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in Regulatory Agency 
Rulemaking, 61 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 19 (1998). 
156 Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a 
Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L. J. 1671, 1748–49 (2012). 
157 DARA & CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM, CLIMATE VULNERABILITY MONITOR 2ND 
EDITION: A GUIDE TO THE COLD CALCULUS OF A HOT PLANET 17 (2012), 
https://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CVM2-Low.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ83-
LPT7]. But see Climate Change and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health [https://perm 
a.cc/MKT3-HL4R] (estimating that climate change causes 250,000 deaths per year). 
158 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL 
WARMING OF 1.5ºC, at 180 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06 
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temperatures rise 1.5 degrees Celsius, there will be increases in heat-related 
morbidity and mortality, ozone-related mortality, and an exacerbated transmission 
of vector-borne diseases.159 Additionally, undernutrition will increase as global food 
security is undermined from the impacts of climate change on food-producing 
regions.160 For example, fisheries and aquaculture will be negatively impacted by 
ocean acidification, and agriculture will be negatively impacted by increases in 
extreme weather events and pests.161 
 
2.  Droughts, Fires, and Floods 
 
The IPCC Report also indicates high confidence in dryness trends in some 
regions, particularly in the Mediterranean region, southern Europe, northern Africa, 
and the Near East.162 Furthermore, the report also projects that river flooding and 
extreme runoff are expected to increase on a global scale.163 Increases in both 
droughts and floods are going to have countless negative impacts on human health, 
from stressing global food security to decreasing freshwater drinking supplies.164 
The IPCC additionally predicts that wildfires will increase as global temperatures 
rise.165 Wildfires will also have a variety of impacts, such as human mortality, 
destruction of homes and infrastructure, and destruction of forests and vegetation 
(which are important carbon sinks).166  
 
3.  Coastal Vulnerabilities: Sea Level Rise and Storms 
 
Increased heat in the upper layers of the ocean has already exacerbated the 
intensity of tropical storms and hurricanes, and as the global temperatures continue 
to rise, these storms are only expected to increase in severity.167 Additionally, with 
the melting of land and marine-based ice sheets due to increased global 
temperatures, sea levels are expected to continue to rise.168 Thus, our planet’s 
heavily populated coastal regions will be particularly vulnerable to climate 
change.169 
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4.  Geo-Political Security Issues: Migration & Conflict 
 
The IPCC Report reveals that human retreat and migration are increasingly 
being considered as a form of adaptation to climate change.170 For example, the 
IPCC Report states that “[t]ropical populations may have to move distances greater 
than 1,000 km if global mean temperature rises by 2°C from 2011–2030 to the end 
of the century.”171 This increased human displacement will cause significant 
political and economic strain on regions, both in those that are losing and those that 
are gaining in population.172 
Additionally, the IPCC Report finds that the increase in drought due to climate 
change “increases the likelihood of sustained conflict for particularly vulnerable 
nations or groups, owing to the dependence of their livelihood on agriculture.”173 
Furthermore, studies have found that “[a] 1ºC increase in temperature or more 
extreme rainfall increases the frequency of intergroup conflicts by 14%.”174 Thus, 
nations will not only have to grapple with changes in their climate and health but 
also those social and economic changes that come with human displacement and 
conflict.175  
Since 2018, the reporting, specificity, and linkage of catastrophic harms to 
greenhouse gas emissions has also increased.176 Though not a scientific body, the 
ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution recognizing the danger of climate 
change in 2019, calling on all levels of government and the private sector to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.177 This resolution should translate to constructive 
knowledge on the part of all U.S. attorneys of the dangers of greenhouse gases. 
 
                                               
170 Id. at 233. 
171 Id. at 245. 
172 Id. at 244. 
173 Id. at 245. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 180, 245. 
176 See, e.g., 2018 YEAR END RETROSPECTIVE, MEDIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
OBSERVATORY 2–5 (2018) https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/icecaps/research/media_cover 
age/summaries/special_issue_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX7X-4ZSE] (describing an 
overall increase in media attention to climate change and noting global greenhouse gases 
make heat waves more frequent and intense). 
177 John Dernbach, American Bar Association Urges Broad Range of Actions to Reduce 
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions “to Net Zero or Below,” JOHN DERNBACH BLOG (Aug. 12, 
2019), https://johndernbach.com/2019/08/american-bar-association-urges-broad-range-of-
actions-to-reduce-u-s-greenhouse-gas-emissions-to-net-zero-or-below/ [https://perma.cc/H 
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B.  Climate Change Impacts from Greenhouse Gas Emissions May Trigger a Duty 
to Disclose, Even If the Harms Are Not Temporally Immediate or Traceable to a 
Specific Victim 
 
When Model Rule 1.6(b) was created in 1983, the paradigmatic case of 
revealing client confidences to prevent the taking of life or infliction of substantial 
bodily harm was when an attorney knew of a specific threat by a client to kill or 
harm persons directly.178 However, early on, the ABA and courts recognized that 
more temporally remote harms, such as harm from hazardous waste, or other 
environmental harms, also constituted a situation in which there would be a 
substantial threat of a loss of life or serious bodily injury.179 The amendment to 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) in 2002 was specifically done to ensure coverage of more 
remote environmental harms, and to expand the privilege of disclosure beyond 
situations where the harm results from a criminal or fraudulent act, to even to apply 
to environmental harms and breaches that are accidental.180 The comment on Model 
Rule 1.6(b)(1) makes its application to disclosure of environmental harms that 
threaten human life or substantial bodily harm crystal clear, stating: 
 
[A] lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic 
waste into a town’s water supply may reveal this information to the 
authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks 
the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the 
lawyer’s disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the 
number of victims.181 
 
Moreover, the impacts of the harm do not have to be immediate, but simply 
foreseeable. The alteration of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) in 2002, replacing the word 
“imminent” with “reasonably certain,” was designed to make sure the disclosure 
exception included both a present and a substantial threat of a future injury.182 
Several courts have similarly recognized the timing disconnect of cause and 
effect in the hazardous substances context, and have broadened the ordinary 
meaning of “imminence” to cover temporally remote harm from hazardous 
substances.183 For example, in Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., the 
Illinois Supreme Court held that the operation of a hazardous waste site in an 
                                               
178 Ken Strutin, Preserving Attorney-Client Confidentiality at the Cost of Another’s 
Innocence: A Systemic Approach, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 499, 506–08 (2011). 
179 Russell, supra note 29, at 413–15. 
180 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6; (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); ABA, A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 71, at 131. 
181 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 6. 
182 ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 71, at 131. 
183 Nicholas Targ, Attorney Client Confidentiality in the Criminal Environmental Law 
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inappropriate location was a “serious” and “imminent” threat to public health, even 
if it was unclear when or whether the harm would occur.184 In other similar cases, 
courts have held that a small probability of harm in the short term does not foreclose 
the concept of a high probability of dangerous harm in the long term.185 The meaning 
of “imminent” is thus defined by the likelihood of harm as opposed to the immediacy 
of the harm.186 
 
C.  Harms from Only Some Disclosed Greenhouse Gas Emissions Need Not Be  
the Sole Cause of the Harm 
 
Obligations to disclose information about dangerous hazardous waste parallel 
greenhouse gases in another way: in both cases, harm may arise not just because of 
the impact of one client’s dangerous release, but rather from a combination of 
releases, either because of cumulative risk or synergistic risks. Because liability 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA)187 is often joint and several or cumulative, Nicholas Targ wrote in 
the 1990s that an attorney should have discretion to report a release of hazardous 
wastes that could lead to death or serious bodily harm, even if the harm could not be 
directly traced to the client’s release.188 
It is similarly difficult to separate harm caused by even a significant amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions with respect to any other sources. But as Targ suggested 
under ethics rules, the fact that certain emissions combine with others to form harm 
does not absolve the party who partially caused the injury from responsibility.189 
Case law in other contexts, as discussed below, has also suggested that the 
cumulative nature of greenhouse gases should not defeat the ability to hold someone 
responsible for or to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. 
Though several common law nuisance cases have been halted because of the 
“universal effect” of greenhouse gases,190 other cases have recognized that merely 
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v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863, 879–80 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[E]specially given the 
extremely attenuated causation scenario alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, it is entirely 
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because a specific actor’s contribution may be small relative to the total amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide does not mean that the source cannot be 
considered or that responsibility for that harm cannot be attributed to a subset of all 
sources that emit greenhouse gas. 
For instance, in August 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit ordered federal regulators to closely consider downstream 
greenhouse gas emissions from the Sabal Trail pipeline, even though the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) argued against that interpretation, claiming 
that analyzing emissions from natural gas sent through the pipeline was too 
speculative.191 The court posited:  
 
What are the “reasonably foreseeable” effects of authorizing a pipeline 
that will transport natural gas to Florida power plants? First, the 
transported gas will be ultimately burned to produce energy in power 
plants. This is not just “reasonably foreseeable,” it is the project’s entire 
purpose, as the pipeline developers themselves acknowledged. . . . It is just 
as foreseeable, and FERC did not dispute, that burning natural gas will 
release exactly the type of carbon compounds that will contribute to 
climate change.192 
 
This reasoning was echoed by a Tenth Circuit decision in September 2017 
looking at the requirements for environmental reviews of federal coal leases.193 That 
court excoriated the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) position that emissions 
must not be considered from coal leasing because the emissions will come from 
other coal mined elsewhere, if not the coal that was to be leased in the decision at 
issue.194 The court noted the economic falsity of the BLM’s argument, held the 
agency’s decision to be arbitrary and capricious, and, in so doing, relied on the 
incremental effects of greenhouse gas emissions from the leases on the climate.195 
Two more district court cases from the Tenth Circuit have followed this reasoning, 
                                               
irrelevant whether any defendant ‘contributed’ to the harm because a discharge, standing 
alone, is insufficient to establish injury.”), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied 569 U.S. 1000 (2013). 
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193 WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Management, 870 F.3d 1222, 1234–35 
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carbon emissions analysis seems to be liberal (i.e., underestimates the effect on climate 
change)”). 
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noting that the incremental effects of federal fossil fuel leasing likely culminated in 
a significant environmental impact that should be considered.196  
The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that disparate greenhouse gas 
emission sources work together to cause climate change and that even a small 
percentage amount is enough to satisfy the harm and redressability prongs of 
standing. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the plaintiffs should not have standing because the emissions that were 
complained of were such a small portion (6% of global CO2 emissions) of the global 
impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change.197 The court noted that it is 
the fact that the law can do something, even if it is a “tentative first step,” that allows 
a court to find causation and redressability.198 
 
While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by 
itself reverse global warming, it by no means [impacts] whether EPA has 
a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it . . . Because of the enormity of the 
potential consequences of climate change, the fact that the effectiveness 
of a remedy might be delayed . . . is essentially irrelevant . . . A reduction 
in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increase, 
no matter what happens elsewhere.199 
 
Common law torts also support attaching responsibility to even small 
contributors to a harm. If it becomes impossible to causally disentangle one party’s 
actions from the cumulative harm, according to common law, tort liability attaches 
to all parties.200 When joint actors cause indivisible harm, they are all equally 
responsible for the damages caused under the theory of “joint and several” 
liability.201  
“Joint and several” liability from torts has been applied to CERCLA liability 
when there are intermingled hazardous wastes in which the impact of one contributor 
cannot be legally separated from that of another.202 Liability can attach even if the 
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specific potentially responsible party (PRP) is a relatively small contributor.203 
Though much of CERCLA case law in this area is dependent on the expansive intent 
of the CERCLA statute, the sharing of liability, even liability attributable to 
relatively minor contributors, is grounded in the common law theories which 
underlie the joint and several liability standard.204 
 
D.  Where Is the Line Drawn? 
 
Assuming reporting of greenhouse gas emissions may be required under some 
circumstances, is there a minimum level of greenhouse gas emissions that would not 
require an attorney to report? Or are any client’s emissions of the smallest magnitude 
a potential ethical issue? There are two different ways to look at this question. Is 
there a legal minimum threshold below which there is no harm that can be defined? 
Or alternatively, is there a practical limit? 
First, it is important to note that so-called natural emissions of CO2 would not 
legally qualify as a potential human harm requiring reporting since natural emissions 
do not contribute to anthropogenic climate change per se. The Earth requires a 
certain amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to make the planet habitable 
at all.205 The dangers humanity faces from greenhouse gas emissions is in the change 
and the rate of change of the greenhouse gas concentration in Earth’s atmosphere.206 
This accelerating rate of concentration began during the Industrial Revolution, and 
is therefore attributable to modern human societies.207 Thus, emissions from animal 
and human respiration, or the natural water cycle, should not be identifiable as 
cognizable harms under Model Rule 1.6 because they are not attributable to post-
industrial technologies. 
This leaves us with greenhouse gases that were produced through a multitude 
of anthropogenic sources since the Industrial Revolution. As noted in the discussion 
in Section III.C, if the reasoning of the tort cases and CERCLA cases on joint and 
several liability is applied in the greenhouse gas context, there would seem to be no 
specific legal minimum for any of these emissions which do contribute to climate 
change. Any amount of greenhouse gas emissions contribute to the injuries caused 
by climate change, and thus any amount of emissions could be deemed dangerous. 
The Supreme Court had no problem finding a 6% annual contribution to global 
carbon dioxide emissions as a cause of harm.208 Certainly, the comment to Model 
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Rule 1.6 concerning the discharge of hazardous substances into a public water 
supply does not specify a minimum limit as long as there is, in fact, a hazard.209  
This suggests that for a company’s emissions not to reach the level of deadly 
harm, the emitted quantity would have to be such that it would not rise to the 
percentage where it would harm even one human life. For example, if climate change 
currently causes 400,000 deaths per year (as noted in the DARA report),210 and the 
quanity of greenhouse gas emissions annually is around 53.5 billion tons,211 then it 
would take 132,500 tons of greenhouse gases to be responsible for one statistical 
death. In 2007, the Scherer coal-fired power plant in Juliette, Georgia emitted 
25,300,000 tons of CO2 in one year,212 or enough for approximately 190 deaths. For 
comparison, the average automobile in the United States emits about 6 tons of CO2 
every year,213 meaning that an individual car would have to operate for around 
22,000 years to cause one death using this simple metric and calculation. 
Of course, such calculations are not specific and are beset by many caveats. 
The UN estimate of deaths per year that climate change may cause is just that: an 
estimate. The amount of emissions in any given year is also an estimate, and the 
accepted figure used above includes land-use changes as well as direct emissions 
from industrial and transportation sources. Moreover, climate change impacts 
happen not just because of one year’s emissions of greenhouse gases, but because 
of the cumulative impact from emissions that have built up in the atmosphere.214 The 
current level of anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent in the atmosphere has been 
building for some time—though over half of these emissions have occurred since 
1988.215 
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All of these concerns indicate that some kind of bright-line legal threshold, 
while technically possible to develop, is difficult to calculate. By way of example, 
however, it highlights the workability of a standard that mirrors the scale of 
magnitude between large industrial sources of CO2 and smaller ones associated with 
individual actions, such as driving a car. Tort law can hold a party responsible for 
one death or harm, even if it only contributed to a small percentage cause of that 
death.216 However, this considerable difference in scale for emitters of greenhouse 
gases exemplifies that attorney ethics law should not recognize harm from every 
single source of greenhouse gas emissions, but only major sources. A practical 
minimal harm threshold may therefore be more workable, which is also supported 
by most tort cases. Though technically any number of tortfeasors could combine in 
one causal set to harm another, in actual cases, the number of responsible parties is 
typically relatively small. While tort cases may have thousands or more plaintiffs in 
class action suits, it is rare to have as large a number of defendants as the plethora 
of greenhouse gas emitters.217  
In tort cases, potential defendants identified for liability tend to be the largest 
or major causes of a particular harm, even if they are among a larger group of 
potential joint tortfeasors.218 The same is true of CERCLA. The EPA will shield 
from liability any de micromis settler, defined as a contributor of less than 110 or 
200 gallons of a waste in certain circumstances, or less than 0.002% of the waste by 
volume.219 
All of this suggests that some kind of rule of reason can be developed that 
identifies which greenhouse gas emitters should be considered as causing imminent 
death or serious harm. As stated in the tort context, a determination of whether it is 
“worth it” to become a plaintiff depends on: “(1) the perception of a harm, (2) the 
perceived knowledge of compensability for that harm, (3) a desire to participate in 
the tort system, and (4) access or an opportunity to participate in the tort system 
without major impediments.”220 
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Similarly, whether it is “worth it” for an attorney to face a risk of failing to 
report information that would be required to avert human death or serious harm will 
depend on multiple factors, though most important will be the potential harm that 
the client’s action causes. Since, in Texas and some other states, the ethical 
disclosure requirement can only be triggered if the client has committed a fraud or 
crime,221 that alone can serve as a triggering threshold for identifying harm. If an 
action is demonstrably fraudulent or constitutes a legal violation, perforce it is of 
concern to society, presumably because the legal requirement is needed to prevent 
some danger. While in the case of fraud the danger may be tied to a financial or 
property interest, rather than a mortal danger, these harms still speak to the 
significance of the unlawful action. 
 
E.  Reporting to Avoid Harm 
 
One other standard that must be present to require an attorney to report client 
behavior that could result in death or serious bodily injury is that the reporting can 
be expected to assist in averting that harm.222 
As noted in Part II.A.2, courts are split on whether environmental reporting 
violations constitute an ongoing harm or a past harm.223 One court that has found an 
ongoing harm noted that the failure to report can lead to demonstrable harm long 
after the reporting date has passed, since a failure to report would continuously 
hobble an agency’s enforcement ability.224 Information deemed material at one time 
may still be material in the future. For any of the violations discussed in this Article, 
one could arguably claim that exposing the violation is likely to either encourage 
some amelioration of harm or discourage continued violations in the future. 
The mere presence of public information may itself reduce harmful emissions 
or risk.225 Emission reporting statutes, such as the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)226 are predicated on the observed trend 
that entities will voluntarily reduce the amount of legal emissions to avoid public 
scrutiny.227 EPCRA requires companies to report toxic chemicals to the EPA, and 
the information is stored in a publicly accessible database called the federal Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI).228 “TRI aims squarely at measuring and disclosing the 
environmental performance of those parties most directly responsible for significant 
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environmental impacts, with the aim of thereby improving performance 
outcomes.”229 
Mark Latham has suggested that treating greenhouse gases the same as toxics 
for reporting purposes under EPCRA would encourage companies to lessen those 
emissions, which in turn would lessen the potential harm in the future.230 
The importance of reporting is also the reason for many voluntary greenhouse 
gas emission reporting program standards, such as those required for members of 
the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).231 As the CDP states: “We must act urgently 
to prevent dangerous climate change and environmental damage. That starts by 
being aware of our impact so that investors, companies, cities and governments can 
make the right choices now.”232 
Companies themselves often recognize and tout greenhouse gas reductions, 
ostensibly to benefit their business outcomes and bottom lines.233 If that is the case, 
then the converse—that failing to disclose to avoid scrutiny will increase greenhouse 
gas emissions—may also be true. 
 The constitutional standing doctrine supports the assumption that allowing 
cases for statutory violations to proceed itself will encourage the avoidance of future 
violations. Merely the risk of repeating a violation can confer standing, even if a 
violation is not ongoing.234 In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, the Fourth Circuit 
found a case to be moot because the violation of a National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit was wholly in the past.235 On appeal at the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case was not moot.236 Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for the 7-2 majority, opined that, for a party to establish that its voluntary 
compliance renders a past violation moot, the party must make it “absolutely clear 
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”237 The 
Court also held that civil penalties for “wholly past violations” could supply redress 
for standing analysis by deterring similar future injuries if violations are 
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“ongoing,”238 taking care to distinguish the redressability inquiry from mootness 
analysis.239  
With respect to attorneys working in government agencies, material 
information that could affect a federal agency’s decision is required to be disclosed 
and explained during APA notice and comment rulemaking.240 Information 
regarding greenhouse gas emissions would, by definition, be material because of the 
impacts of climate change, and could therefore affect the agency’s final substantive 
rule language. For example, using an incorrect and misleading social cost of carbon 
in an APA Section 553 rulemaking to support an agency’s record of decision will 
result in an understatement of the impacts of greenhouse gases. Taking action to 
promote a more accurate estimate should affect or change the agency’s decision, 
which in turn should lead to fewer emissions and, consequently, lessen harm caused 
by those emissions. 
In the particular case of a government lawyer who has been asked to use 
incorrect or false data to justify a new rule that will lead to an increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions—especially of the magnitude that would be at stake under a broad 
federal rule such as restrictions on coal-fired power plants—participating in such 
work could facilitate a substantial contribution to climate change-related harms. 
Rather than perpetrate a public fraud that could cause death or substantial bodily 
harm, the attorney could withdraw and disclose her opinion about the legality of the 
agency’s action.241 In turn, withdrawal and disclosure could “prevent” harm from 
occurring. 
Whether withdrawal and disclosure are required or merely permitted depends 
on whether using unquestionably false materials in specific administrative activities, 
such as an APA Section 553 rulemaking, would constitute a criminal or fraudulent 
act under a particular state’s construction of this definition—regardless of the 
characterization under federal law.242 The operation of Model Rules 1.2(d), 
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1.16(a)(1), 1.6(b), and 4.1(b) could then take over. According to the ABA Model 
Rule commentary: 
 
Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of 
withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. 
In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose 
information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have 
assisted the client’s crime or fraud. If the lawyer can avoid assisting a 
client’s crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under 
paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is 
prohibited by Rule 1.6.243 
 
Therefore, by lessening future greenhouse gas emissions, attorney disclosure 
and/or withdrawal would prevent at least some of the harm from occurring. 
 
V.  REPORTING ETHICAL VIOLATIONS COULD BE A VERY EFFECTIVE TOOL 
 TO TARGET GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
 
Unlike the process of bringing a court case, making an ethical violation claim 
against an attorney is both easy in most states and incentivized by the ethical rules 
themselves. 
 
A.  Ease of Reporting Against an Offending Attorney 
 
1.  Initial Reporting  
 
“Each state has its own agency that performs [disciplinary investigations and 
actions] in regard to lawyers practicing in that state.”244 The burden of filing a 
complaint alleging a lawyer’s legal ethical violation is not high in most states, with 
proponents typically having to show only a “belief” in misconduct.245   
The process in Texas is illustrative and fairly typical of most states’ processes 
of reporting and resolving ethics complaints against attorneys. According to the 
Texas State Bar’s online portal, anyone who believes they have witnessed attorney 
misconduct (clients, the public, judges, etc.) can file a grievance against a Texas 
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attorney.246 To do this, a grievance form must be completed, including copies of all 
supporting documents.247 The complaint is then reviewed by the Texas State Bar 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel (CDC), which will determine whether the grievance, on 
its face, alleges professional misconduct.248 This determination, referred to as 
classification of the grievance, is made within 30 days of the grievance being filed.249 
Next, if the alleged facts constitute a violation of the state’s attorney ethics rules, the 
grievance will be classified as a formal “Complaint,” and the respondent attorney 
will be informed and given 30 days from the date of receipt to respond.250  
 
2.  Just Cause Determination 
 
According to the grievance description on the Texas Bar Association’s web 
site: 
 
Within 60 days of the response deadline, the CDC, through its 
investigation,251 must determine whether there is Just Cause to believe that 
professional misconduct occurred . . . If the [CDC] determines that there 
is no Just Cause to proceed on the Complaint, the case is presented to a 
Summary Disposition Panel, an independent decision maker with the 
discretion to accept or reject the CDC’s determination. [The Panel is 
comprised] of local grievance committee members composed of two-
thirds lawyers and one-third public members. All information and results 
of the CDC’s investigation is presented to the panel at a docket hearing 
without the presence of either the complainant or respondent. If the panel 
accepts the CDC’s determination, the Complaint will be dismissed. If the 
                                               
246 File a Grievance, STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/Content/Navigat 
ionMenu/ForThePublic/ProblemswithanAttorney/GrievanceEthicsInfo1/File_a_Grievance.





251 Grievance Procedure, STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Tem 
plate.cfm?Section=Disciplinary_Process_Overview&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=29668 [https://perma.cc/NB6L-2JLD] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). This 
investigation may include the following: requesting additional information from the 
complainant; obtaining information from corroborative witnesses; receipts; hourly records 
or billing statements; correspondence to and from client; message slips, telephone logs, or 
records of long-distance telephone calls; court records, such as pleadings, motions, orders 
and docket sheets; copies of settlement checks and/or disbursement statements; IOLTA or 
trust account records, such as monthly bank statements, deposit slips, deposit items and 
disbursement items; State Bar Membership Department records including records of current 
or past administrative suspensions; client file; or witness interviews and obtaining sworn 
statements.  
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panel rejects the CDC’s determination, the panel votes to proceed on the 
Complaint.252 
 
3.  Referral to Trial 
 
Once a complaint is determined to have possible merit, an attorney can 
determine “to have the case heard before an evidentiary panel of the grievance 
committee or by a district court, with or without a jury.”253 The tribunal then reaches 
a decision of whether the attorney violated an ethical duty.254 
 
B.  Requirement of Attorney Disclosure of Other Attorney Ethical Violations 
 
The model rules reflect the uniform requirement that an attorney who has 
knowledge of an ethics violation by another attorney must report that to the 
appropriate authorities, absent other requirements of confidentiality.255 While 
historically, this requirement has been considered difficult to enforce,256 and 
insufficiently utilized257 in the situation where one wants to report alleged 
misconduct, there are few barriers to doing so. Texas explains the rule thusly: “[A] 
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of 
applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall 
inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”258 
Commentary to Texas Rule 8.3 makes it clear that when in doubt, an attorney 
is expected to err on the side of protecting the public:  
  
Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the 
profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they have knowledge 
not protected by Rule 1.05 that a violation of these rules has occurred . . . 
Frequently, the existence of a violation cannot be established with 
certainty until a disciplinary investigation has been undertaken. Similarly, 
an apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that 
only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Consequently, a lawyer 
should not fail to report an apparent disciplinary violation merely because 
he cannot determine its existence or scope with absolute certainty. 




255 Nikki Ott & Heather Newton, A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3: How It Is Used 
and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. L. & ETHICS 747, 747 (2003) (citing 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002)). 
256 Id. at 748. 
257 Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from 
Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 451–52 (2007). 
258 TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.03 (2019). 
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Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely 
to discover the offense. 259 
 
The procedural ease in filing ethics complaints, along with the requirement that 
other attorneys disclose evidence of violations, demonstrates how the system could 
be used to ultimately accomplish another goal. 
In a recent article entitled The Ethics Resistance, Brian Sheppard has described 
the increased use of attorney ethics complaints for political purposes in the Trump 
era.260 These complaints are uncoupled from traditional complaints by clients or 
other attorneys.261 While his article focuses mostly on the power of political claims 
to shame public officials, imagine how many more private attorneys could be 
susceptible to a motivated group of complainants.  
This puts the attorney representing clients who contribute to greenhouse gas 
emissions between a rock and a hard place. Since greenhouse gas emissions have 
not yet been determined by a state bar association to cause substantial death or bodily 
harm in a way that triggers the state equivalent of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), an attorney 
would worry that to disclose confidential information related to greenhouse gas 
emissions would itself be a breach of client confidentiality duties. However, if the 
harms caused by greenhouse gas emissions through concomitant climate change are 
identified by a state’s attorney disciplinary decisionmaker as information about 
death or substantial bodily harm that must be revealed, the attorney could be subject 
to disciplinary action for failing to make disclosures related to their client’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Attorneys could ask for state attorney general opinions, but these are not 
binding and would themselves draw attention to client behavior. All of this together 
may push risk-averse attorneys toward not entering or continuing in practice areas 
where they would represent greenhouse gas emitters, thereby depriving these parties 
of the legal representation necessary to navigate their businesses. This is exactly the 
outcome that climate activists would like to see: depriving the attorney “oxygen” 
from the greenhouse gas emissions “fire.” 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
There is a multitude of entities that either emit major amounts of greenhouse 
gases or facilitate the emission of greenhouse gases. The same greenhouse gases, in 
turn, are causing an unprecedented and rapid change in the climate of the entire 
Earth, resulting in massive impacts on all sectors of society, leading to over 100,000 
                                               
259 TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.03 cmt 1 (2019) (emphasis added). 
260 Sheppard, supra note 245, at 259. 
261 Id. at 261. 
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attributable deaths per year.262 And the impacts are only going to accelerate.263 Every 
state in the United States has promulgated attorney ethical laws that may require or 
allow disclosure of otherwise confidential client activities if the activities could 
cause imminent death or substantial bodily harm. As this Article has explained, 
greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change could meet that standard of harm. 
Faced with relative inaction and even hostility on the part of the United States 
federal government in addressing the greenhouse gas emissions and the harms the 
country causes, climate activists in the United States and around the world have gone 
beyond legislative debates and are increasing their use of alternative methods to 
change behavior and curb the harms caused by climate change. Climate activists are 
using existing legal regimes—from common law to statutes not specifically 
designed for greenhouse gas emissions—to curb climate change. These methods 
have been directed at private corporations and governments. 
Given that greenhouse gas emissions could trigger attorney ethical 
responsibilities, it is only a matter of time before attorney ethics rules become 
another legal tool that climate advocacy organizations use to try and lessen 
continued greenhouse gas emissions. Practicing attorneys have a duty to stay abreast 
of relevant ethical rules and their application to the ever-evolving practice of law. 
The climate activism emerging now, coupled with the recent judicial recognition of 
the harms caused by climate change and their connection to greenhouse gases, 
suggests caution. Therefore, attorneys should be aware of this possibility and react 
accordingly. Whether in the employ of a large multinational firm or the government, 
ethical obligations exist. This Article reveals the possible coming vulnerability of 
attorneys for failing to disclose the dangers of client activity related to climate 
change.  
                                               
262 See discussion supra Part III. 
263 See WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, THE GLOBAL CLIMATE IN 2015–
2019, at 3 (2019), https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=9936 [https://perma.cc 
/C8CR-FLQL] (describing “[c]ontinuing and accelerating trends” in major greenhouse gas 
emissions, global temperature increases and “other key climate indicators.”). 
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Appendix A: State versions of ABA Model Ethics Rule 1.6(b) regarding disclosure 
of confidential client information in face of death or substantial bodily harm 
 
State that Requires Disclosure if Attorney Would be Assisting a Criminal 
or Fraudulent Act 
 
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):  
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal confidential information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary, and to the extent required by Rules 3.3, 4.1(b), 
8.1 or 8.3 must reveal, such information: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm, or to prevent the wrongful execution or incarceration of 
another . . . . 264  
 
Rule 4.1(b):  
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
. . . 
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by 
Rule 1.6.265 
 
The 12 States that Require Disclosure 
 
Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, ER 1.6(b): 
 
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information [relating to the 
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal 
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial 
bodily harm.266  
 
                                               
264 MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2020), 
https://www.mass.gov/supreme-judicial-court-rules/rules-of-professional-conduct-rule-16-
confidentiality-of-information [https://perma.cc/P9V9-2QLU]. 
265 MASS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(b) (2020), https://www.mass.gov/supreme-
judicial-court-rules/rules-of-professional-conduct-rule-41-truthfulness-in-statements-to 
[https://perma.cc/8FLG-9ER9]. In other words, Massachusetts Rule 1.6(b)(1) and 4.1(b) 
should be read together to require that if an attorney is considered to be assisting in a criminal 
or fraudulent act relating to the GHG emissions, then the attorney must disclose. 
266 ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ER 1.6(b) (2019), http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/ 
RulesofProfessionalConduct/ViewRule?id=26 [https://perma.cc/LB8M-EZ6N]. 
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Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b): 
 
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information [relating to the 
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal 
or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death 
or substantial bodily harm.267 
 
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4-1.6(b)(2): 
 
(b) A lawyer must reveal confidential information to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary:  
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or  
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.268  
 
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(c): 
 
(c) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.269 
 
New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, 
as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary, to prevent the client or another person:  
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or 
substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial 
interest or property of another . . . .270  
  
                                               
267 CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (2020), https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publicat 
ions/PracticeBook/PB.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM7Q-YM38]. 
268 R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6(b)(2) (2019), https://www-media.floridabar.org/up 
loads/2019/09/Ch-4-from-2020_03-SEP-RRTFB-9-19-19-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/25HG-
KSDP]. 
269 ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(c) (2010), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Supre 
meCourt/Rules/Art_VIII/ArtVIII_NEW.htm#1.6 [https://perma.cc/UYP5-ZRRK]. 
270 N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), https://www.njcourts.gov/attor 
neys/assets/rules/rpc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J84-U4EJ]. 
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North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b): 
 
(b) A lawyer is required to reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer believes 
reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm.271 
 
Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(c)(1): 
 
(c) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is 
necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .272 
 
Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.05(e): 
 
(e) When a lawyer has confidential information clearly establishing 
that a client is likely to commit a criminal or fraudulent act that is 
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm to a person, the 
lawyer shall reveal confidential information to the extent revelation 
reasonably appears necessary to prevent the client from committing 
the criminal or fraudulent act.273 
 
Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer must reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client when required by other provisions of these rules or to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:  
(1) to prevent the client or another person from committing a 
criminal act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to 
result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, a person 
other than the person committing the act . . . .274 
                                               
271 N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (2016), https://www.ndcourts.gov/legal-
resources/rules/ndrprofconduct/1-6 [https://perma.cc/U5EL-K8JN]. 
272 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8, RPC 1.6(c)(1) (2017), http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/rules/supreme 
-court/8 [https://perma.cc/Y9UX-QRFH]. 




274 VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2009), https://www.vermontjudiciary. 
org/sites/default/files/documents/VermontRulesofProfessionalConduct.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/Z5NY-Z3SF]. 
2020] DISCLOSING THE DANGER 615 
 
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(c)(1): 
 
(c) A lawyer shall promptly reveal: 
(1) the intention of a client, as stated by the client, to commit a 
crime reasonably certain to result in death or substantial bodily 
harm to another or substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another and the information necessary to prevent 
the crime, but before revealing such information, the attorney 
shall, where feasible, advise the client of the possible legal 
consequences of the action, urge the client not to commit the 
crime, and advise the client that the attorney must reveal the 
client’s criminal intention unless thereupon abandoned. 
However, if the crime involves perjury by the client, the 
attorney shall take appropriate remedial measures as required 
by Rule 3.3 . . . .275 
 
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) shall reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .276  
 
Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b): 
 
(b) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that 
the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or 
substantial bodily harm or in substantial injury to the financial 
interest or property of another.277 
  
                                               
275 VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c)(1) (2020), http://www.vsb.org/pro-
guidelines/index.php/main/print_view [https://perma.cc/V2NS-29SP]. 
276 WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), https://www.courts.wa.gov/ 
court_rules/ [https://perma.cc/47S6-8LT2]. 
277 WIS. S. CT. R. 20:1.6(b) (2017), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/scr/20 
[https://perma.cc/4RYA-XKUY]. 
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The 37 States that Permit Disclosure 
 
Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to the 
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary: 
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm . . . . 278 
 
Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1)(A)-(B): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal a client’s confidence or secret to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain  
(A) death [or]  
(B) substantial bodily harm . . . . 279 
 
Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to the 
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary:  
(1) to prevent the commission of a criminal act;  
. . . . 
[Comment 6] Although the public interest is usually best served by 
a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of 
information relating to the representation of their clients, the 
confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. For instance, in 
becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee 
that the client or a third person intends to commit a crime and may 
reveal that information to prevent the crime. The overriding value 
of life and physical integrity permits disclosure reasonably 
necessary to prevent death or bodily harm. Other future harms as a 
result of a criminal act, such as fraud, damage to economic interests, 
or loss of property which are reasonably certain to occur, also permit 
disclosure if necessary to eliminate the threat.280 
 
                                               
278 ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), http://judicial.alabama.gov/ 
docs/library/rules/cond1_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP3M-P6EB]. 
279 ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2009), 
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/rules/docs/prof.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDJ7-3V8Y]. 
280 Id. r. 1.6 cmt 6. 
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California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3-100(B): 
 
(B) A member may, but is not required to, reveal confidential 
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
that the member reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to 
prevent a criminal act that the member reasonably believes is likely 
to result in death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.281 
 
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .282 
 
Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .283 
 
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.6(b)(1)(ii) 
 
“A lawyer may reveal information [gained in the professional 
relationship with a client] which the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary:  
(i) to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to 
another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party 
criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;  
(ii) to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by 
subparagraph (i) above . . . .284 
 
                                               
281 CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-100(B) (2018), https://www.calbar.ca.gov/ 
Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-of-Professional-Conduct/Current-Rules/Rule-3-
100 [https://perma.cc/8PWA-V2DB]. 
282 COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2018), https://www.cobar.org/For-
Members/Opinions-Rules-Statutes/Rules-of-Professional-Conduct/Rule-16-Confidentiality 
-of-Information [https://perma.cc/8CCZ-MYSQ]. 
283 DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2020), https://courts.delaware.gov/ 
rules/pdf/2020DelawareLawyersRulesProfessionalConduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9KH-
QU9A]. 
284 GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(i)–(ii) (2017), https://www.gabar.org/ 
Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule57 [https://perma.cc/2TJJ-DPJX]. 
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Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or 
fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to 
result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury 
to the financial interests or property of another . . . .285 
 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(2): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
 . . . . 
(2) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . . 286 
 
Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .287 
 
Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 32:1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:  
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .288 
  
                                               
285 HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2014), https://www.courts.state.hi. 
us/docs/court_rules/rules/hrpcond.htm#Rule%201.6 [https://perma.cc/99LU-5NCQ]. 
286 IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (2014), https://isb.idaho.gov/wp-
content/uploads/irpc.pdf [https://perma.cc/93GX-GM4A]. 
287 IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), https://www.in.gov/judiciary 
/rules/prof_conduct/#_Toc461714661 [https://perma.cc/RP8M-P3BP]. 
288 IOWA S. CT. R. 32:1.6(b)(1) (2012), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/Court 
RulesChapter/12-31-2012.32.pdf [https://perma.cc/B467-NHJF]. 
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Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1), (4): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to representation 
of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a crime . . . .289 
 
Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .290 
 
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .291 
 
Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal a confidence or secret of a client to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain substantial bodily harm or 
death . . . .292 
 
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) An attorney may reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the attorney reasonably 
believes necessary:  
                                               
289 KAN. S. CT. R. 226, KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), 
https://www.kscourts.org/Rules-Orders/Rules/1-6-Client-Lawyer-Relationship-Confident 
iality-of [https://perma.cc/DE5Q-7Z2L]. 
290 KY. S. CT. R. 3.130(1.6)(b)(1) (2018), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.kybar.org/re 
source/resmgr/SCR3/SCR_3.130_(1.6).pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZG9-J79M]. 
291 LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2015), https://lalegalethics.org/louis 
iana-rules-of-professional-conduct/article-1-client-lawyer-relationship/rule-1-6-confident 
iality-of-information/ [https://perma.cc/N6SX-UFBE]. 
292 ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2015), https://mebaroverseers.org/ 
regulation/bar_rules.html?id=88169 [https://perma.cc/2P3B-6EQL]. 
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(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .293  
 
Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(c)(4): 
 
(c) A lawyer may reveal:  
. . . .  
(4) the intention of a client to commit a crime and the 
information necessary to prevent the crime . . . .294 
. . . . 
Comment: If the prospective crime is likely to result in substantial 
injury, the lawyer may feel a moral obligation to take preventive 
action. When the threatened injury is grave, such as homicide or 
serious bodily injury, a lawyer may have an obligation under tort or 
criminal law to take reasonable preventive measures. Whether the 
lawyer’s concern is based on moral or legal considerations, the 
interest in preventing the harm may be more compelling than the 
interest in preserving confidentiality of information relating to the 
client. . . .295 
 
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.6(b)(6): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client if:  
. . . .  
(6) the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary 
to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm 
. . . .296 
  
                                               





294 MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c)(4) (2020), https://courts.michigan.gov/ 
Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/rules/Documents/Michigan%20Rules%20of%20Profession
al%20Conduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T6H-RNK7]. 
295 Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 
296 MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (2019), https://www.revisor.mn.gov 
/court_rules/pr/subtype/cond/id/1.6/ [https://perma.cc/A9SX-KBAP]. 
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Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .297 
 
Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:  
(1) to prevent death or substantial bodily harm that is reasonably 
certain to occur . . . .298 
 
Montana Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
 (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .299 
 
Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct § 3-501.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a crime or to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm . . . .300 
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Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) To prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .301 
 
New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to the 
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary:  
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm or to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that 
the lawyer believes is likely to result in substantial injury to the 
financial interest or property of another . . . .302 
 
New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 16-106(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .303 
 
New York Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal or use confidential information to the extent 
that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .304 
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North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(3): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information protected from disclosure by 
paragraph (a) to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
. . . . 
(3) to prevent reasonably certain death or bodily harm . . . .305 
 
Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client, including information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege under applicable law, to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary for any of the following purposes:  
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .306 
 
Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to representation of a 
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .307 
 
Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(2): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
. . . .  
(2) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .308 
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Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(c)(1): 
 
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to representation 
of a client] to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .309 
 
Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to representation 
of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm . . . .310 
 
South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(2): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:  
. . . . 
(2) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .311 
 
South Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm . . . .312 
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Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:  
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .313 
 
West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
 (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm . . . .314 
 
Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1): 
 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to representation 
of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:  
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act;  
(2) to prevent the client from committing a fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another . . . .315 
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